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Abstract
We present a new locally differentially private algorithm for the heavy hitters problem which
achieves optimal worst-case error as a function of all standardly considered parameters. Prior
work obtained error rates which depend optimally on the number of users, the size of the domain,
and the privacy parameter, but depend sub-optimally on the failure probability.
We strengthen existing lower bounds on the error to incorporate the failure probability, and
show that our new upper bound is tight with respect to this parameter as well. Our lower
bound is based on a new understanding of the structure of locally private protocols. We further
develop these ideas to obtain the following general results beyond heavy hitters.
• Advanced Grouposition: In the local model, group privacy for k users degrades propor-
tionally to ≈ √k, instead of linearly in k as in the central model. Stronger group privacy
yields improved max-information guarantees, as well as stronger lower bounds (via “pack-
ing arguments”), over the central model.
• Building on a transformation of Bassily and Smith (STOC 2015), we give a generic trans-
formation from any non-interactive approximate-private local protocol into a pure-private
local protocol. Again in contrast with the central model, this shows that we cannot obtain
more accurate algorithms by moving from pure to approximate local privacy.
1 Introduction
In the heavy-hitters problem, each of n users holds as input an item from some domain X. Our
goal is to identify all “heavy-hitters,” which are the domain elements x ∈ X for which many of the
users have x as their input. In this work we study the heavy-hitters problem in the local model
of differential privacy (LDP), where the users randomize their data locally, and send differentially
private reports to an untrusted server that aggregates them. In our case, this means that every
user only sends the server a single randomized message that leaks very little information about the
input of that user.
The heavy hitters problem is perhaps the most well-studied problem in local differential pri-
vacy [4, 17, 24, 3, 27]. In addition to the intrinsic interest of this problem, LDP algorithms for
∗Department of Computer Science, Princeton University. mbun@cs.princeton.edu
†John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University. minilek@seas.harvard.edu.
Supported by NSF grant IIS-1447471 and CAREER award CCF-1350670, ONR Young Investigator award N00014-
15-1-2388 and DORECG award N00014-17-1-2127, an Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship, and a Google Faculty
Research Award.
‡Dept. of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science. u@uri.co.il. Work done while the
third author was a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Research on Computation and Society, Harvard University.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
71
1.
04
74
0v
1 
 [c
s.D
S]
  1
3 N
ov
 20
17
heavy-hitters provide important subroutines for solving many other problems, such as median es-
timation, convex optimization, and clustering [31, 26]. In practice, heavy-hitters algorithms under
LDP have already been implemented to provide organizations with valuable information about
their user bases while providing strong privacy guarantees to their users. Two prominent examples
are by Google in the Chrome browser [12] and Apple in iOS-10 [33], making local heavy-hitter
algorithms the most widespread industrial application of differential privacy to date.
Before describing our new results, we define our setting more precisely. Consider a set of n
users, where each user i holds as input an item xi ∈ X. We denote S = (x1, . . . , xn), and refer to
S as a “distributed database” (as it is not stored in one location, and every xi is only held locally
by user i). We say that a domain element x ∈ X is ∆-heavy if its multiplicity in S is at least ∆,
i.e., if there are at least ∆ users whose input is x. Our goal is to identify all ∆-heavy elements for
∆ as small as possible. Specifically, we receive a sequence of messages—one message yi from every
user i—at the end of which our goal is to report a list L ⊂ X such that
1. Every ∆-heavy element x is in L, and
2. |L| = O(n/∆), i.e., the list size is proportional to the maximum possible number of ∆-heavy
elements.
We also want, for each x ∈ L, to output a value which is within ∆ of the multiplicity of x in S. The
parameter ∆ is referred to as the error of the protocol, as elements with multiplicities less than ∆
are “missed” by the protocol. We refer to the probability that the protocol does not successfully
achieve the above objectives as its failure probability, denoted by β. The privacy requirement is
that for every user i, the distribution of the message yi should not be significantly affected by the
input of the user. Formally,
Definition 1.1 ([9]). An algorithm A : X → Y satisfies ε-differential privacy if for every two
inputs x, x′ and for every output y ∈ Y we have Pr[A(x) = y] ≤ eε · Pr[A(x′) = y].
Solving the heavy-hitters under LDP becomes harder for smaller choices of ∆,1 and the work
on LDP heavy-hitters have focused on constructing protocols that can achieve as small a value of
∆ as possible.
In this work we combine ideas from the recent locally-private heavy-hitters algorithm of [3] with
the recent non-private algorithm of [22], and present a new efficient LDP heavy-hitters algorithm
achieving optimal worst-case error ∆ as a function of the number of users n, the size of the domain
|X|, the privacy parameter ε, and the failure probability β. Prior state-of-the-art results [4, 3]
either obtained error with sub-optimal dependence on the failure probability β, or had runtime
at least linear in |X| (which is not realistic in real applications, where X may be the space of all
reasonable-length URL domains). Our result improves the worst-case error, while keeping all other
complexities the same. See Table 1.
1For intuition, observe that we cannot hope to have ∆ = 1. Indeed, if only one user is holding some x∗ as input
(so x∗ is 1-heavy), then the outcome distribution of the protocol remains approximately the same even when this
user holds a different input (in which case x∗ does not appear in the data at all, and it is no longer 1-heavy).
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Performance metric This work Bassily et al. [3] Bassily and Smith [4]2
Server time O˜ (n) O˜ (n) O˜
(
n2.5
)
User time O˜ (1) O˜ (1) O˜
(
n1.5
)
Server memory O˜ (
√
n) O˜ (
√
n) O˜
(
n2
)
User memory O˜ (1) O˜ (1) O˜
(
n1.5
)
Communication/user O (1) O (1) O (1)
Public randomness/user O˜(1) O˜(1) O˜(n1.5)
Worst-case error O
(
1
ε ·
√
n log
(
|X|
β
))
O
(
1
ε ·
√
n log
(
|X|
β
)
log
(
1
β
))
O
(
log1.5( 1β )
ε ·
√
n log |X|
)
Table 1: Comparison of our protocol with prior state-of-the-art results. For simplicity, the O˜
notation hides logarithmic factors in n and |X|.
1.1 Lower Bound on the Error and New Understandings of the Local Model
We strengthen a lower bound on the error by [6, 17, 34] and [4] to incorporate the failure probability,
and show that our new upper bound is tight. Our lower bound is based (conceptually) on the
following new understandings of the local privacy model:
Advanced Grouposition. An important property of differential privacy is group privacy. Recall
that differential privacy ensures that no single individual has a significant effect on the outcome
(distribution) of the computation. A similar guarantee also holds for every small group of indi-
viduals, but the privacy guarantee degrades (gracefully) with the size of the group. Specifically,
if an algorithm satisfies an individual-level guarantee of ε-differential privacy, then it satisfies kε-
differential privacy for every group of k individuals. We observe that in the local model, group
privacy degrades the privacy parameter only by a factor of ≈ √k, unlike in the centralized model.
This observation allows us to show improved bounds on the max-information—a measure of the
dependence of an algorithm’s output on a randomly chosen input—of locally-private protocols [8].
Strong group privacy is, however, a mixed blessing as it also leads to stronger lower bounds (of the
type known as “packing arguments”) for pure-private local algorithms.
Pure vs. Approximate LDP. Another important property of differential privacy is that it also
degrades gracefully under composition. This allows us to design algorithms that access their input
database using several (say k) differentially private mechanisms as subroutines, and argue about
the overall privacy guarantees. In the case of pure-privacy, the privacy parameter deteriorates by a
factor of at most k. However, in the case of approximate-privacy, k-fold composition degrades the
privacy parameter only by a factor of ≈ √k (see [11]).
We show that in the non-interactive local model we can enjoy the best of both worlds. First,
we can show that in some cases, (an approximate version of) the composition of locally private
algorithms can satisfy pure-privacy while enjoying the same strong composition guarantees of
2The user’s run-time and memory in [4] can be improved to O(n) if one assumes random access to the public ran-
domness, which we do not assume in this work. In fact, our protocol can be implemented without public randomness
while attaining essentially the same performances.
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approximate-privacy. Motivated by this observation, we then proceed to show that in the lo-
cal model approximate-privacy is actually never more useful than pure-privacy (at least for non-
interactive protocols). Specifically, building on a transformation of Bassily and Smith [4], we
give a generic transformation from any non-interactive approximate-private local protocol into a
pure-private local protocol with the same utility guarantees. This is the first formal proof that
approximate local-privacy cannot enable more accurate analyses than pure local-privacy.
In Section 7 we describe how our new lower bound for the heavy hitters under pure-LDP follows
from advanced grouposition, and how the lower bound extends to approximate-LDP via our generic
transformation. In addition, we provide a direct analysis for our lower bound that results from a
direct extension of the argument of [6, 17, 34] (using ideas from [4]).
2 Preliminaries from Differential Privay
Notations. Databases are (ordered) collections of elements from some data universe X. Two
databases S, S′ ∈ Xn are called neighboring if they differ in at most one entry. Throughout this
paper, we use the notation O˜ to hide logarithmic factors in n and |X| (the number of users and
the size of the domain).
Consider a database where each entry contains information pertaining to one individual. An
algorithm operating on databases is said to preserve differential privacy if a change of a single record
of the database does not significantly change the output distribution of the algorithm. Intuitively,
this means that individual information is protected: whatever is learned about an individual could
also be learned with her data arbitrarily modified (or without her data at all).
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [9]). A randomized algorithm M : Xn → Y is (ε, δ) dif-
ferentially private if for every two neighboring datasets S, S′ ∈ Xn and every T ⊆ Y we have
Pr[M(S) ∈ T ] ≤ eε · Pr[M(S′) ∈ T ] + δ, where the probability is over the randomness of M .
2.1 Local Differential Privacy
In the local model, each individual holds her private information locally and only releases the
outcomes of privacy-preserving computations on her own data. This is modeled by letting the algo-
rithm access each entry xi in the input database S = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn separately, via differentially
private local randomizers.
Definition 2.2 (Local Randomizer, LR Oracle [9, 19]). A local randomizer R : X → W is a
randomized algorithm that takes a database of size n = 1. Let S = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn be a database.
An LR oracle LRS(·, ·) gets an index i ∈ [n] and a local randomizer R, and outputs a random value
w ∈W chosen according to the distribution R(xi).
Definition 2.3 (Local differential privacy [9, 19]). An algorithm satisfies (ε, δ)-local differential
privacy (LDP) if it accesses the database S only via the oracle LRS with the following restriction:
for all possible executions of the algorithm and for all i ∈ [n], if LRS(i, R1), . . . , LRS(i, Rk) are the
algorithm’s invocations of LRS on index i, then the algorithm B(x) = (R1(x), R2(x), . . . , Rk(x)) is
(ε, δ)-differentially private.
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In the above definition, k is the number of invocations of LRS on index i made throughout
the execution (potentially this number can be different for different users, and can even be chosen
adaptively throughout the execution). In our heavy-hitters protocol we will have k = 1, meaning
that every user only sends one response to the server. Local algorithms that prepare all their queries
to LRS before receiving any answers are called non-interactive; otherwise, they are interactive. The
focus of this work is on non-interactive protocols.
3 A Heavy-Hitters Protocol with Optimal Error
Let S = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn be a database, which may be distributed across n users (each holding
one row). For x ∈ X, we will be interested in estimating the the frequency (or multiplicity) of x in
S, i.e.,
fS(x) = |{i ∈ [n] : xi = x}|.
Specifically, we would like to solve the following problem while guaranteeing LDP:
Definition 3.1. Let S ∈ Xn be a (distributed) database. In the heavy-hitters problem with error
∆ and failure probability β, the goal is to output a list Est ⊆ X×R of elements and estimates, of
size |Est | = O(n/∆), such that with probability 1− β
1. For every (x, a) ∈ Est we have that |fS(x)− a| ≤ ∆; and,
2. For every x ∈ X s.t. fS(x) ≥ ∆ we have that x appears in Est.
As in previous works, our algorithm for the heavy-hitters problem is based on a reduction to
the simpler task of constructing a frequency oracle:
Definition 3.2. Let S ∈ Xn be a (distributed) database. A frequency oracle with error ∆ and
failure probability β is an algorithm that, with probability at least 1 − β, outputs a data structure
capable of approximating fS(x) for every x ∈ X with error at most ∆.
Observe that constructing a frequency oracle is an easier task than solving the heavy-hitters
problem, as every heavy-hitters algorithm is in particular a frequency oracle. Specifically, given
a solution Est to the heavy-hitters problem, we can estimate the frequency of every x ∈ X as
fˆS(x) = a if (x, a) ∈ Est, or fˆS(x) = 0 otherwise. Moreover, observe that ignoring runtime, the
two problems are identical (since we can query the frequency oracle on every domain element to
find the heavy-hitters).
The literature on heavy-hitters and frequency oracles under LDP has focused on the goal of
minimizing the error ∆. However, as Bassily and Smith showed, under LDP, every algorithm for
either task must have worst case error at least
Ω
(
1
ε
√
n · log |X|
)
.
This lower bound is known to be tight, as constructions of frequency oracles with matching error
were presented in several works [24, 17, 4, 3]. These works also presented reductions that transform
a frequency oracle into a heavy-hitters algorithm. However, their reductions resulted in a sub-
optimal dependency of the error in the failure probability β (on which the lower bound above is
not informative). In this work we give a new (privacy preserving) reduction from the heavy-hitters
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problem to the frequency oracle problem, achieving error which is optimal in all parameters. Our
reduction is a private variant of the recent non-private algorithm of [22], and our final construction
uses the frequency oracle of [3].
3.1 Existing Techniques
In this section we give an informal survey of the techniques of [3] and [22], and highlight some of
the ideas behind the constructions. This intuitive overview is generally oversimplified, and hides
many of the difficulties that arise in the actual analyses.
3.1.1 Reduction with Sub-Optimal Dependence on the Failure Probability
Assume that we have a frequency oracle protocol with worst-case error ∆, and let S = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
Xn be a (distributed) database, where user i holds the input xi. We now want to use our frequency
oracle to identify a small set of “potential heavy-hitters”. Specifically, we would like to identify all
elements whose frequencies in S are at least 2∆. We outline the approach of [3].
Let h : X → [Y ] be a (publicly known) random hash function, mapping domain elements into
some range of size Y . We will now use h in order to identify the heavy-hitters. To that end, let
x∗ ∈ X denote such a heavy-hitter, appearing at least 2∆ times in the database S, and denote
y∗ = h(x∗). Assuming that Y is big enough, w.h.p. we will have that x∗ is the only input element
(from S) that is mapped (by h) to the hash value y∗. Assuming that this is indeed the case, we
will now attempt to identify x∗ one “coordinate” (as defined below) at a time.
Let us assume that elements from X are represented as M symbols from an alphabet [W ]. For
every coordinate m ∈ [M ], denote Sm = (h(xi), xi[m])i∈[n], where xi[m] is the mth symbol of xi.
That is, Sm is a database over the domain ([Y ]×[W ]), where the row corresponding to user i is
(h(xi), xi[m]). Observe that since h is public, every user can compute her own row locally. As x
∗
is a heavy-hitter, for every m ∈ [M ] we have that (y∗, x∗[m]) appears in Sm at least 2∆ times.
On the other hand, as we assumed that x∗ is the only input element that is mapped to y∗, we get
that (y∗, w′) does not appear in Sm at all for every w′ 6= x∗[m]. Recall that our frequency oracle
has error at most ∆, and hence, we can use it to accurately determine the symbols of x∗. Using
this strategy we can identify a set of size Y containing all heavy-hitters: For every hash value
y ∈ [Y ], construct a potential heavy-hitter xˆ(y) symbol-by-symbol, where the mth symbol of xˆ(y) is
the symbol w s.t. (y, w) is most frequent in Sm. By the above discussion, this strategy identifies
all of the heavy-hitters.
Recall that we assumed here that Y (the size of the range of the hash function h) is big enough
so that there are no collisions among input elements (from S). In fact, the analysis can withstand
a small number of collisions (roughly
√
n, since we are aiming for error bigger than
√
n anyway).
Nevertheless, for the above strategy to succeed with high probability, say w.p. 1−β, we will need to
set Y & √n/β. As β can be exponentially small, this is unacceptable, and hence, Bassily et al. [3]
applied the above strategy with a large failure probability β, and amplified the success probability
using repetitions. Unfortunately, using repetitions still causes the error to increase by a factor of√
log(1/β) (because applying multiple private computations to the same dataset degrades privacy).
Specifically, Bassily et al. [3] obtained the following result.
Theorem 3.3 ([3]). Let ε ≤ 1, and let S ∈ Xn be a (distributed) database. There exists an ε-LDP
algorithm that returns a list Est of length O˜(
√
n) such that with probability 1− β
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1. For every (x, a) ∈ Est we have that |a− fS(x)| ≤ O
(
1
ε
√
n log
(
min{n,|X|}
β
))
.
2. For every x ∈ X s.t. fS(x) ≥ O
(
1
ε
√
n log
( |X|
β
)
log
(
1
β
))
, we have that x appears in Est.
The server uses processing memory of size O˜(
√
n), and runs in time O˜(n). Each user has O˜(1)
runtime, memory, and communication.
3.1.2 A Non-Private Reduction Based on List-Recoverable Codes [22]
Recall that in the reduction of Bassily et al. [3] there is only one hash function h. If that hash
function “failed” for some heavy-hitter x (meaning that too many other input elements collide
with x), then we cannot identify x and we needed to repeat. Suppose instead that we modify the
reduction to introduce an independent hash function hm for every coordinate m ∈ [M ]. The upside
is that now, except with exponentially small probability (in M), every heavy-hitter x∗ causes at
most a small fraction of the hash functions to fail. Then hopefully we are able to detect most of
the symbols of x∗. If instead of applying this scheme to x∗ itself, we apply it to an error-correcting
encoding of x∗ with constant rate and constant relative distance, then we can indeed recover x∗ this
way.3 However, aside from the fact that some of the symbols are missing, it now becomes unclear
how to concatenate the coordinates of the elements that we are constructing. Specifically, in the
construction of Bassily et al., the fact that h(x∗) = y∗ appeared throughout all coordinates is what
we used to concatenate the different symbols we identified. If the hash functions are independent
across m, then this does not work.
We now describe this strategy in more detail, and describe the solution proposed by Larsen et
al. [22] to overcome this issue. Fix a heavy-hitter x∗. For every coordinate m ∈ [M ] where hm
does not fail on x∗, we have that the frequency of (hm(x∗), x∗[m]) “stands out” in comparison to
every (hm(x
∗), w′) where w′ 6= x∗[m], meaning that (hm(x∗), x∗[m]) appears in Sm significantly
more times than any other (hm(x
∗), w′). Hence, for every coordinate m ∈ [M ] and for every hash
value y ∈ [Y ] we identify (at most 1) symbol w s.t. (y, w) “stands out” compared to all other (y, w′)
in Sm. In other words, for every m ∈ [M ] we construct a list Lm = {(y, w)} of “stand outs” in
Sm. The guarantee is that for every heavy-hitter x
∗, we have that (hm(x∗), x∗[m]) appears in Lm
for most coordinates m ∈ [M ]. If we could single out all occurrences of (hm(x∗), x∗[m]) in these
lists, then we could concatenate the symbols x∗[m] and reconstruct x∗. The question is how to
match symbols from different lists. As was observed in [14] that studied the related problem of
`1/`1 compressed sensing, this can be done using list-recoverable codes.
Recall that in a (standard) error correcting code, the decoder receives a noisy codeword (repre-
sented by, say, M symbols from [W ]) and recovers a (noiseless) codeword that agrees with the noisy
codeword on at least (1−α) fraction of the coordinates, assuming that such a codeword exists. An
error correcting code thus protects a transmission from any adversarial corruption of an α-fraction
of a codeword. A list-recoverable code protects a transmission from uncertainty as well as corrup-
tion. Instead of receiving a single (possibly corrupted) symbol in each coordinate, the decoder for
a list-recoverable code receives a short list of size ` of possible symbols. Let L1, . . . , LM be such a
sequence of lists, where list Lm contains the m
th symbol of a noisy codeword. The requirement on
3We remark that this presentation is oversimplified. In the analysis of [22], the problem is not only that each x∗
causes a small fraction of the hash functions to fail. Rather, the problem is that a small fraction of the coordinates
are “bad” (since otherwise it may be that each x is failed by very few hash functions, but every hm ends up “bad”
because they fail for some different x’s).
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the decoder is that it is able to recover all possible codewords x that “agree” with at least (1− α)
fraction of the lists, in the sense that mth symbol of x appears in Lm. Formally,
Definition 3.4 ([16]). An (α, `, L)-list-recoverable code is a pair of mappings (Enc,Dec) where
Enc : X → [Z]M , and Dec : ([Z]`)M → XL, such that the following holds. Let L1, . . . , LM ∈
[Z]`. Then for every x ∈ X satisfying |{m : Enc(x)m ∈ Lm}| ≥ (1 − α)M we have that x ∈
Dec(L1, . . . , LM ).
In our case, the lists Lm = {(y, w)} contain the “stand outs” of Sm, with the guarantee that
for every heavy-hitter x∗, we have that (hm(x∗), x∗[m]) appears in Lm for most coordinates m.
We can therefore, in principle, use a list-recoverable code in order to recover all heavy-hitters (in
fact, with this formulation it suffices that the lists Lm contain only the set of heavy items {w}
found to be heavy in Sm). However, there are currently no explicit codes achieving the parameter
settings that are needed for the construction. To overcome this issue, Larsen et al. [22] constructed
a relaxed variant of list-recoverable codes, and showed that their relaxed variant still suffices for
their (non-private) reduction. Intuitively, their relaxed code utilizes the randomness in the first
portion of every element in the lists (i.e., the outcome of the hash functions). Formally,
Definition 3.5. An (α, `, L)-unique-list-recoverable code is a pair of mappings (Enc,Dec) where
Enc : X → ([Y ]×[Z])M , and Dec : (([Y ]×[Z])`)M → XL, such that the following holds. Let
L1, . . . , LM ∈ ([Y ]×[Z])`. Assume that for every m ∈ [M ], if (y, z), (y′, z′) ∈ Lm then y 6= y′. Then
for every x ∈ X satisfying |{m : Enc(x)m ∈ Lm}| ≥ (1− α)M we have that x ∈ Dec(L1, . . . , LM ).
Theorem 3.6 ([22]). There exist constants C > 1 and 0 < α < 1 such that the following holds.
For all constants M ≤ log |X| and Y, ` ∈ N, and for every fixed choice of functions h1, . . . , hM :
X → [Y ], there is a construction of an (α, `, L)-unique-list-recoverable code
Enc : X → ([Y ]× [Z])M and Dec : (([Y ]× [Z])`)M → XL,
where L ≤ C · ` and Z ≤ (|X|1/M · Y )C . Furthermore, there is a mapping E˜nc : X → [Z]M such
that for every x ∈ X we have Enc(x) =
(
(h1(x), E˜nc(x)1), ..., (hM (x), E˜nc(x)M )
)
.
There is a pre-processing algorithm which, given M,Y, `, h1, . . . , hM , computes a description of
the functions Enc,Dec in poly(M) time.4 Then, evaluating Enc(x) takes linear time and space in
addition to O(M) invocations of the hash functions, and evaluating Dec(L1, . . . , LM ) takes linear
space and polynomial time.
For completeness, we include the proof in Appendix B. In the following sections we construct
a private version of the algorithm of [22] and show that it achieves optimal error in all parameters.
We remark that the focus in [22] was on space and runtime, and that in fact, in the non-private
literature the meaning of “minimal achievable error” is unclear, as achieving zero error is trivial (it
is “only” a question of runtime and memory).
3.2 Additional Preliminaries
We start by presenting the additional preliminaries that enable our construction.
4The pre-processing algorithm has deterministic poly(M) time for every M of the form M = Di for some universal
constant D. Otherwise, the algorithm has poly(M) Las Vegas expected runtime. We ignore this issue for simplicity.
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3.2.1 Frequency Oracle
Recall that a frequency oracle is a protocol that, after communicating with the users, outputs a data
structure capable of approximating the frequency of every domain element x ∈ X. Our protocol
uses the frequency oracle of [3], named Hashtogram, as a subroutine.
Theorem 3.7 (Algorithm Hashtogram [3]). Let S ∈ Xn be a database which is distributed across
n users, and let β, ε ≤ 1. There exists an ε-LDP algorithm such that the following holds. Fix a
domain element x ∈ X to be given as a query to the algorithm. With probability at least 1− β, the
algorithm answers the query x with a(x) satisfying:
|a(x)− fS(x)| ≤ O
(
1
ε
·
√
n log
(
min{n, |X|}
β
))
.
The server uses processing memory of size O˜(
√
n), and runs in time O˜(1) per query (plus O˜(n) for
instantiation). Each user has O˜(1) runtime, memory, and communication. The O˜ notation hides
logarithmic factors in n and |X|.
Observe that by a union bound, algorithm Hashtogram answers every fixed set of w queries with
worst case error O
(
1
ε ·
√
n log
(
w·min{n,|X|}
β
))
. The min{n, |X|} factor is known to be unnecessary
for some regimes of n, |X|, β, or if one allows a slightly larger runtime or memory. In particular,
Bassily et al. gave a (simplified) analysis of algorithm Hashtogram for the case where the domain
X is small, with the following guarantees.
Theorem 3.8 (Algorithm Hashtogram [3]). Let S ∈ Xn be a database which is distributed across
n users, and let β, ε ≤ 1. There exists an ε-LDP algorithm such that the following holds. Fix a
domain element x ∈ X to be given as a query to the algorithm. With probability at least 1− β, the
algorithm answers the query x with a(x) satisfying:
|a(x)− fS(x)| ≤ O
(
1
ε
·
√
n log
(
1
β
))
.
The server uses processing memory of size O˜(|X|), and runs in time O˜(1) per query (plus O˜ (|X|2)
for instantiation). Each user has O˜(1) runtime, memory, and communication. The O˜ notation
hides logarithmic factors in n and |X|.
We will only apply Theorem 3.8 on small domains X (satisfying |X|2 = O˜(n)). Our eventual
analysis in the proof of Theorem 3.13 will make use of both accuracy guarantees of Hashtogram.
3.2.2 The Poisson Approximation
When throwing n balls into R bins, the distribution of the number of balls in a given bin is
Bin(n, 1/R). As the Poisson distribution is the limit distribution of the binomial distribution when
n/R is fixed and n → ∞, the distribution of the number of balls in a given bin is approximately
Pois(n/R). In fact, in some cases we may approximate the joint distribution of the number of balls
in all the bins by assuming that the load in each bin is an independent Poisson random variable
with mean n/R.
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Theorem 3.9 (e.g., [25]). Suppose that n balls are thrown into R bins independently and uniformly
at random, and let Xi be the number of balls in the i
th bin, where 1 ≤ i ≤ R. Let Y1, · · · , YR
be independent Poisson random variables with mean n/R. Let f(x1, · · · , xR) be a nonnegative
function. Then,
E [f(X1, · · · , XR)] ≤ e
√
nE [f(Y1, · · · , YR)] .
In particular, the theorem states that any event that takes place with probability p in the
Poisson case, takes place with probability at most pe
√
n in the exact case (this follows by letting f
be the indicator function of that event).
We will also use the following bounds for the tail probabilities of a Poisson random variable:
Theorem 3.10 ([2]). Let X have Poisson distribution with mean µ. For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
Pr[X ≤ µ(1− α)] ≤ e−α2µ/2
Pr[X ≥ µ(1 + α)] ≤ e−α2µ/2.
3.2.3 Concentration (with Limited Independence)
We first state a version of the multiplicative Chernoff bound, including a formulation of the upper
tail bound which holds under limited independence.
Theorem 3.11 ([30, Theorem 2]). Let X1, . . . , Xn be random variables taking values in {0, 1}. Let
X =
∑n
i=1Xi and µ = E[X]. Then for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
1. If the Xi’s are dµαe-wise independent, then Pr[X ≥ µ(1 + α)] ≤ exp(−α2µ/3).
2. If the Xi’s are fully independent, then Pr[X ≤ µ(1− α)] ≤ exp(−α2µ/2).
Next, we present a limited independence version of Bernstein’s inequality.
Theorem 3.12 ([18, Lemma 2]). Let X1, . . . , Xn be k-wise independent random variables, for an
even integer k ≥ 2, that are each bounded by T in magnitude. Let X = ∑ni=1Xi and µ = E[X].
Let σ2 =
∑
i E(Xi − EXi)2. Then there exists a constant C > 0 such that for all λ > 0,
Pr [|X − µ| > λ] ≤ Ck ·
(
(σ
√
k/λ)k + (Tk/λ)k
)
.
3.3 The Full Protocol
In this section we construct and analyze our heavy-hitters algorithm. The full algorithm appears
as Algorithm PrivateExpanderSketch.
It is immediate from the construction that algorithm PrivateExpanderSketch satisfies ε-LDP.
We now proceed with the utility analysis. While we must make the restriction n ≤ |X| for the
analysis to go through, we remark that in the complementary case n > |X|, it is possible to just
apply the frequency oracle Hashtogram (Theorem 3.7) to every item in X and obtain the same
runtime, memory, and communication guarantees.
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Algorithm PrivateExpanderSketch
Notation: Let CM , CY , C`, Cg, and Cf be universal constants (to be specified later).
Denote M = CM · log |X|/ log log |X|, Y = logCY |X|, and ` = C` · log |X|.
Public randomness: Random partition of [n] into M sets I1, . . . , IM .
Pairwise independent hash functions h1, · · · , hM : X → [Y ].
(Cg · log |X|)-wise independent hash function g : X → [B].
Tool used: A unique-list-recoverable code (Enc,Dec) with parameters M,Y, ` using h1, . . . , hM ,
as in Theorem 3.6.
Setting: Each player i ∈ [n] holds a value xi ∈ X. Define S = (x1, · · · , xn).
For m ∈ [M ], let Sm =
(
g(xi),Enc(xi)m
)
i∈Im
=
(
g(xi), hm(xi), E˜nc(xi)m
)
i∈Im
.
1. For every m ∈ [M ], use Hashtogram(Sm) with privacy parameter ε2 to get estimates fˆSm(b, y, z)
for fSm(b, y, z) for every (b, y, z) ∈ [B]×[Y ]×[Z].
2. For every (m, b) ∈ [M ]×[B], initialize Lbm = ∅.
3. For every (m, b, y) ∈ [M ]×[B]×[Y ]:
(a) Let z = argmax{fˆSm(b, y, z)}.
(b) If fˆSm(b, y, z) ≥ Cf · log log |X|ε ·
√
n
log |X| = O
(√
n log |X|
εM
)
and |Lbm| ≤ C` · log |X| then add
(y, z) to Lbm.
4. For every b ∈ [B] let Ĥb = Dec(Lb1, . . . , LbM ). Define Ĥ =
⋃
b∈[B] Ĥ
b.
5. Use Hashtogram(S) with privacy parameter ε2 to obtain fˆS(x) ≈ fS(x) for every x ∈ Ĥ.
6. Return Est =
{(
x, fˆS(x)
)
: x ∈ Ĥ
}
.
Theorem 3.13. Let S ∈ Xn be a database which is distributed across n users, with n ≤ |X|,
and let β, ε ≤ 1. Algorithm PrivateExpanderSketch returns a list Est of length O˜(√n) s.t. with
probability 1− β we have that
1. For every (x, a) ∈ Est we have that |a− fS(x)| ≤ O
(
1
ε
√
n log
(
min{n,|X|}
β
))
.
2. For every x ∈ X s.t. fS(x) ≥ O
(
1
ε
√
n log
( |X|
β
))
, we have that x is included in Est.
The server uses processing memory of size O˜(
√
n), and runs in time O˜(n). Each user has O˜(1)
runtime, memory, and communication.
Proof. Item 1 of the lemma follows directly from Theorem 3.7 (the properties of Hashtogram).
We now prove item 2. Below, we will freely assume that n ≥ O(log |X|/ε2), with item 2 being
vacuously true otherwise. For some constant CH ≥ 1, we say that an element x ∈ X is heavy if
fS(x) ≥ CHε
√
n · log |X|, and non-heavy otherwise. We let H denote the set of all heavy elements.
Observe that |H| ≤ ε ·√n/ log |X|. For b ∈ [B] denote the set of all heavy elements that are
mapped to b under g as Hb = {x ∈ H : g(x) = b}.
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We begin by defining a sequence of events E1, . . . , E7. We will show that all of these events
occur simultaneously with high probability, and that if they indeed all occur, then the guarantee
of item 2 holds. First consider the following event:
Event E1 (over the choice of g):
For every b ∈ [B], the number of heavy elements that are mapped to b under g is at most
C1 log |X|. Furthermore, the sum of frequencies of all non-heavy elements (i.e., elements
x /∈ H) that are mapped to b is at most C1ε
√
n log3/2 |X|, where C1 > 0 is an absolute
constant. That is, ∀b ∈ [B]:
|Hb| ≤ C1 log |X| and
∑
x/∈H: g(x)=b
fS(x) ≤ C1
ε
√
n log3/2 |X|
We now show that E1 happens with high probability. For B =
⌈
1
10CH
· ε√n/ log3/2 |X|
⌉
≤ |X|,
it follows by the limited independence Chernoff bound (Theorem 3.11, item 1) and a union bound
over all b ∈ [B] that for some constant C1 > 0,
Pr
g
[∃b ∈ [B] s.t. |{x ∈ H : g(x) = b}| > C1 log |X|] < 1
2|X| . (1)
Here, we made use of the fact that g : X → [B] is (Cg · log |X|)-wise independent for a constant Cg.
We next invoke the limited independence formulation of Bernstein’s inequality (Theorem 3.12). Fix
b ∈ [B]. We will consider the collection of random variables Rx indexed by x ∈ X\H defined as
follows. Define Rx = 1g(x)=b ·fS(x). Then each Rx is bounded by T < 1ε
√
n · log |X| and ∑x/∈H Rx
has variance
σ2 =
∑
x/∈H
f2S(x)
(
1
B
− 1
B2
)
≤
∑
x/∈H
1
B
· f2S(x) ≤
1
ε2
n log2 |X|.
It then follows by Theorem 3.12 and a union bound over all b ∈ [B] that
Pr
g
∃b ∈ [B] s.t. ∑
x/∈H: g(x)=b
fS(x) >
C1
ε
√
n log3/2 |X|
 < 1
2|X| . (2)
This shows that Pr[E1] ≥ 1− 1|X| . We now continue the analysis assuming that Event E1 occurs.
Event E2 (over partitioning [n] into I1, . . . , IM):
For every (b,m) ∈ [B]×[M ] we have |{i∈Im : xi /∈H and g(xi)=b}| ≤ 2C1Mε
√
n log3/2 |X|.
Conditioned on Event E1, for every b ∈ [B] we have that |{i ∈ [n] : xi /∈ H and g(xi) = b}| ≤
C1
ε
√
n log3/2 |X|. Hence, by the Chernoff bound (Theorem 3.11, item 2) and a union bound over
all (b,m) ∈ [B]×[M ], we get that Pr[E2|E1] ≥ 1− 1|X| .
Event E3 (over partitioning [n] into I1, . . . , IM):
For every x ∈ H there exists a subset Mx3 ⊆ [M ] of size |Mx3 | ≥ (1− α10)M s.t. for every
m ∈Mx3 we have that |{i ∈ Im : xi = x}| ≥ fS(x)2M .
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Recall that M = CM · log |X|/ log log |X|. As in Theorem 3.9 (the Poisson approximation), we
analyze event E3 in the Poisson case. To that end, fix x ∈ H, and let J˜1, · · · , J˜M be independent
Poisson random variables with mean fS(x)M . Let us say that m ∈ [M ] is bad if J˜m < fS(x)2M . Now
fix m ∈ [M ]. Using a tail bound for the Poisson distribution (see Theorem 3.10), assuming that
n ≥ 8C2M log |X|, we have that m is bad with probability at most 1logCM |X| . As J˜1, · · · , J˜M are
independent, the probability that there are more than αM/10 bad choices for m is at most
(
M
αM/10
)(
1
logCM |X|
)αM/10
≤
(
10e
α logCM |X|
)αCM log |X|
10 log log |X|
=
(
10e
α
)αCM log |X|
10 log log |X|
·
(
1
|X|
)αC2M
10
=
(
1
|X|
)αC2M
10
−o(1)
.
Hence, by Theorem 3.9 we get that
Pr
[
There are at least αM/10 indices m s.t.
|{i ∈ Im : xi = x}| < fS(x)/(2M)
]
≤ e
√
fS(x) ·
(
1
|X|
)αC2M
10
−o(1)
.
Choosing CM ≥ 10α and using the union bound over every x ∈ H we get that Pr[E3] ≥ 1− 1|X| .
Event E4 (over partitioning [n] into I1, . . . , IM):
There exists a subset M4 ⊆ [M ] of size |M4| ≥ (1− α10)M s.t. for every m ∈M4 we have
n
2M ≤ |Im| ≤ 2nM .
An analysis similar to that of Event E3 shows that Pr[E4] ≥ 1− 1|X| .
Event E5 (over sampling h1, · · · , hM):
For every b ∈ [B] there exists a subset M b5 ⊆ [M ] of size |M b5 | ≥ (1− α10)M s.t. for every
m ∈M b5 we have that hm perfectly hashes the elements of Hb = {x ∈ H : g(x) = b}.
We analyze event E5 assuming that event E1 occurs, in which case |Hb| ≤ C1 · log |X| for every
b ∈ [B]. Fix b ∈ [B] and m ∈ [M ]. Recall that hm is a pairwise independent hash function mapping
X to [Y ]. Hence, for x′ 6= x we have Prhm [hm(x′) = hm(x)] = 1Y . Using the union bound over
every pair (x, x′) with x′ 6= x ∈ Hb, assuming that Y ≥ C21 · logCM+2 |X|, we have
Pr
hm
[∃(x, x′) ∈ Hb ×Hb s.t. x 6= x′, hm(x′) = hm(x)] ≤ 1
Y
(|Hb|
2
)
≤ 1
logCM |X| .
That is, the probability that hm does not perfectly hash the elements of Hb is at most
1
logCM |X| . As
the hash functions h1, . . . , hM are independent, the probability that there are more than αM/10
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choices of m s.t. hm does not perfectly hash Hb is at most
(
M
αM/10
)(
1
logCM |X|
)αM/10
≤
(
1
|X|
)αC2M
10
−o(1)
.
Setting CM ≥ 10α and using the union bound over every b ∈ [B] we get that Pr[E5|E1] ≥ 1− 1|X| .
Event E6 (over sampling h1, · · · , hM):
For every x ∈ H there exists a subset Mx6 ⊆ [M ] of size |Mx6 | ≥ (1− α10)M s.t. for every
m ∈ Mx6 we have that |{i ∈ Im : xi /∈ H and g(xi) = g(x) and hm(xi) = hm(x)}| ≤
1
εM
√
n · log |X|.
We analyze event E6 assuming that event E2 occurs, in which case for every b,m we have that
|{i∈Im : xi /∈H, g(xi)=b}| ≤ 2C1Mε
√
n log3/2 |X|. Fix x ∈ H and fix m ∈ [M ]. We have that
E
hm
[|{i ∈ Im : xi /∈H, g(xi)=g(x), hm(xi)=hm(x)}|] =
∑
i∈Im:
xi /∈H,
g(xi)=g(x)
E
hm
[
1hm(xi)=hm(x)
]
≤ 1
Y
· 2C1
Mε
√
n log3/2 |X|.
Thus, by Markov’s inequality, we have that
Pr
hm
[
|{i ∈ Im : xi /∈H, g(xi)=g(x), hm(xi)=hm(x)}| ≥ 1
εM
√
n · log |X|
]
≤ 2C1 log |X|
Y
.
Let us say that m is bad for x if |{i ∈ Im : xi /∈H, g(xi)=g(x), hm(xi)=hm(x)}| ≥ 1εM
√
n · log |X|.
So m is bad with probability at most 2C1 log |X|Y . As the hash functions h1, . . . , hM are independent,
assuming that Y ≥ 2C1 · logCM+1 |X|, the probability that there are more than αM/10 bad choices
for m is at most (
M
αM/10
)(
1
logCM |X|
)αM/10
≤
(
1
|X|
)αC2M
10
−o(1)
.
Setting CM ≥ 10α and using the union bound over every x ∈ H we get that Pr[E6|E2] ≥ 1− 1|X| .
Event E7 (over the randomness of Hashtogram):
For every b ∈ [B] there exists a subset M b7 ⊆ [M ] of size |M b7 | ≥ (1 − α5 )M s.t. for
every m ∈ M b7 and every (y, z) ∈ [Y ]×[Z] we have that
∣∣∣fˆSm(b, y, z)− fSm(b, y, z)∣∣∣ ≤
C7·log log |X|
ε
√
n/ log |X|, where C7 > 0 is an absolute constant.
We analyze Event E7 conditioned on Event E4, and let M4 ⊆ [M ] denote the set from Event
E4. Recall that |M4| ≥ (1− α10)M , and that for every m ∈M4 we have that n/2M ≤ |Sm| ≤ 2n/M .
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Fix b ∈ [B] and fix m ∈ M4. Let us say that m is bad if there exists (y, z) ∈ [Y ]×[Z] s.t.∣∣∣fˆSm(b, y, z)− fSm(b, y, z)∣∣∣ > 6ε√|Sm| · log(4Y Z · logCM |X|) = O ( log log |X|ε √n/ log |X|). By the
properties of algorithm Hashtogram (Theorem 3.8), we have that m is bad with probability at most
1
logCM |X| . As the coins of Hashtogram are independent across different executions (i.e., for different
values of m), the probability that there are more than α|M4|/10 bad choices for m ∈M4 is at most
( |M4|
α|M4|/10
)(
1
logCM |X|
)α|M4|/10
≤
(
1
|X|
)αC2M
20
−o(1)
.
Setting CM ≥ 20α and using the union bound over every b ∈ [B] we get that Pr[E7|E4] ≥ 1− 1|X| .
We are now ready to complete the proof, by showing that whenever E1, E2, E3, E4, E5, E6, E7
occur we have that every heavy element x ∈ H appears in the output list Ĥ. To that end, fix x ∈ H,
and denote Mx = Mx3 ∩M4 ∩Mg(x)5 ∩Mx6 ∩Mg(x)7 . Observe that |Mx| ≥ (1− α)M . We now show
that for every m ∈Mx it holds that (hm(x), E˜nc(x)m) ∈ Lg(x)m , in which case, by the properties of
the code (Enc,Dec) we have that x ∈ Ĥg(x) = Dec(Lg(x)1 , . . . , Lg(x)M ), and hence, x ∈ Ĥ.
So let m ∈Mx. By Event E3 we have that
fSm
(
g(x), hm(x), E˜nc(x)m
)
≥ CH · log log |X|
2CM · ε
√
n/ log |X|.
Hence, by Event E7 we have that
fˆSm
(
g(x), hm(x), E˜nc(x)m
)
≥ Cf · log log |X|
ε
√
n/ log |X|, (3)
where Cf =
(
CH
2CM
− C7
)
.
On the other hand, let z 6= E˜nc(x)m, and recall that by Event E5 there does not exist a heavy
element x′ 6= x s.t. g(x′) = g(x) and hm(x′) = hm(x). In addition, by Event E6, there could be at
most log log |X|ε
√
n/ log |X| indices i ∈ Im s.t. xi is non-heavy and g(xi) = g(x) and hm(xi) = hm(x).
That is,
fSm (g(x), hm(x), z) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
i ∈ Im :
xi ∈ H,
g(xi) = g(x),
hm(xi) = hm(x),
E˜nc(xi)m = z

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
i ∈ Im :
xi /∈ H,
g(xi) = g(x),
hm(xi) = hm(x),
E˜nc(xi)m = z

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 0 + log log |X|
ε
√
n/ log |X|.
Hence, by Event E7 we have that
fˆSm (g(x), hm(x), z) ≤ (C7 + 1)
log log |X|
ε
√
n/ log |X|. (4)
By Inequalities (3) and (4), and by setting CH large enough, we ensure that E˜nc(x)m is identified
in step 3a as the argmax of fˆSm(g(x), hm(x), ·). Hence, in order to show that (hm(x), E˜nc(x)m)
is added to L
g(x)
m in step 3b, it suffices to show that |Lg(x)m | ≤ C` · log |X| for some constant
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C`. First recall that, by Event E1, there are at most C1 · log |X| heavy elements x′ ∈ H s.t.
g(x′) = g(x). Hence, there could be at most C1 · log |X| pairs (y, z) ∈ Lg(x)m s.t. ∃x′ ∈ H s.t.
(g(x′), hm(x′), E˜ncm(x′)) = (g(x), y, z). Therefore, it suffices to show that L
g(x)
m contains at most
O(log |X|) pairs (y, z) that are added because they do not correspond to a heavy element x′ ∈ H.
To that end, observe that by the condition on step 3b, and by Event E7, in order for a pair (y, z)
to be added to L
g(x)
m it must be that fSm(g(x), y, z) ≥ log log |X|ε
√
n/ log |X|. However, by Event E2,
there are at most 2C1·log log |X|CM ·ε
√
n log |X| elements in Sm that yield the same value g(x), but are
not generated from a heavy element. Hence, there could be at most 2C1CM · log |X| pairs (y, z) ∈ L
g(x)
m
such that there is no x′ ∈ H where (g(x′), hm(x′), E˜ncm(x′)) = (g(x), y, z). Overall we have that
|Lg(x)m | ≤ C` · log |X| for C` = C1 + 2C1/CM .
4 Advanced Grouposition and Max-Information
In this section, we show that local differential privacy admits stronger guarantees of group privacy
than differential privacy in the central model. In particular, the protection offered to groups of size
k under LDP degrades proportionally to about
√
k, a quadratic improvement over what happens
in the central model. It is not a coincidence that this behavior mirrors the privacy guarantee of
differentially private algorithms under composition. Indeed, the proof of our “advanced” group
privacy bound will follow the same strategy as the proof of the so-called advanced composition
theorem [11, 10].
Definition 4.1. For random variables A,B, define the privacy loss function `A,B(y) = ln(Pr[A =
y]/Pr[B = y]). Define the privacy loss random variable LA,B to be `A,B(y) for y ← A.
Just as in the proof of the advanced composition theorem, we will leverage the fact that the
expected privacy loss of any individual local randomizer is LRi(xi),Ri(xi) = O(ε
2), which is sub-
stantially smaller than the worst-case privacy loss of ε. Since each local randomizer is applied
independently, the cumulative privacy loss incurred by changing a group of k inputs concentrates
to within O(
√
kε) of its expectation O(kε2).
Theorem 4.2 (Advanced Grouposition for Pure LDP). Let x ∈ Xn and x′ ∈ Xn differ in at most
k entries for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Let A = (R1, . . . , Rn) : Xn → Y be ε-LDP. Then for every δ > 0
and ε′ = kε2/2 + ε
√
2k ln(1/δ), we have
Pr
y←A(x)
[
ln
Pr[A(x) = y]
Pr[A(x′) = y] > ε
′
]
≤ δ.
In particular, for every δ > 0 and every set T ⊆ Y , we have Pr[A(x) ∈ T ] ≤ eε′ Pr[A(x′) ∈ T ] + δ.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that x and x′ differ in the first k coordinates.
Since each randomizer is applied independently, we may write the privacy loss between A(x) and
A(x′) as
LA(x),A(x′) =
k∑
i=1
LRi(xi),Ri(x′i)
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Since each Ri is ε-differentially private, Proposition 3.3 of [5] implies
E
[
LRi(xi),Ri(x′i)
]
≤ 1
2
ε2, |LRi(xi),Ri(x′i)| ≤ ε.
Hence, by Hoeffding’s inequality, we have that for every t > 0,
Pr[LR(x),R(x′) > kε
2/2 + t] ≤ e−t2/2kε2 .
Setting t = ε
√
2k ln(1/δ) completes the proof.
We remark that it is straightforward to extend Theorem 4.2 to handle (ε, δ)-LDP algorithms
using the same ideas as in the proof of the advanced composition theorem (see the discussion in
Section 2.2 of [34]).
Theorem 4.3 (Advanced Grouposition for Approximate LDP). Let x ∈ Xn and x′ ∈ Xn differ
in at most k entries for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Let A = (R1, . . . , Rn) : Xn → Y be (ε, δ)-LDP. Then
for every δ′ > 0, ε′ = kε2/2 + ε
√
2k ln(1/δ′), and every set T ⊆ Y , we have Pr[A(x) ∈ T ] ≤
eε
′
Pr[A(x′) ∈ T ] + δ + kδ′.
Our improved group privacy bound immediately implies a strong bound on the max-information
of an LDP protocol. The max-information [8] of an algorithm is a measure of how much information
it reveals about a randomly chosen input. The motivation for studying max-information comes from
its ability to ensure generalization in adaptive data analysis.
Definition 4.4. Let Z,W be jointly distributed random variables. We say that the β-approximate
max-information between Z and W , denoted Iβ∞(Z;W ), is at most k if for every measurable subset
T of the support of (Z,W ) with Pr[(Z,W ) ∈ T ] > β, we have
ln
Pr[(Z,W ) ∈ T ]− β
Pr[Z ⊗W ∈ T ] ≤ k.
Here, Z ⊗ W denotes the product distribution formed from the marginals Z and W . Given an
algorithm A : Xn → R, we say the β-approximate max-information of A, denoted Iβ∞(A, n) ≤ k if
Iβ∞(D;A(D)) ≤ k for every distribution D on Xn.
Dwork et al. [8] showed that ε-DP algorithms have max-information O(εn). Moreover, they have
β-approximate max-information O(ε2n+ ε
√
n log(1/β), but only when the input distribution D is
a product distribution. Subsequent work by Rogers et al. [29] extended this analysis to (ε, δ)-DP
algorithms, for which they showed the restriction to product distributions to be necessary.
Using our group privacy bound for local differential privacy, we show that even under non-
product distributions, the max-information of ε-LDP protocols has the same behavior as ε-DP
algorithms on product distributions. This provides a distinct advantage in adaptive data analysis,
as it means ε-LDP algorithms can be composed with arbitrary low max-information algorithms in
any order while giving strong generalization guarantees.
Theorem 4.5. Let A : Xn → Y be ε-LDP. Then for every β > 0, we have Iβ∞(R,n) ≤ nε2/2 +
ε
√
2n ln(1/β).
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Proof. Let D be a distribution over Xn. Then for every k > 0,
Pr
x∼D,y←A(x)
[
ln
Pr[D = x,A(x) = y]
Pr[D = x] Pr[A(D) = y] > k
]
= Pr
x∼D,y←A(x)
[
ln
Pr[A(x) = y]
Pr[A(D) = y] > k
]
= Pr
x∼D,y←A(x)
[
ln
Pr[A(x) = y]
Ex′∼D [Pr[A(x′) = y]] > k
]
≤ Pr
x∼D,y←A(x)
[
E
x′∼D
[
ln
Pr[A(x) = y]
Pr[A(x′) = y]
]
> k
]
by Jensen’s inequality
≤ max
x,x′
Pr
y←A(x)
[
ln
Pr[A(x) = y]
Pr[A(x′) = y] > k
]
.
By Theorem 4.2, this quantity as at most β for k = nε2/2 + ε
√
2n ln(1/β).
The claim now follows from the general fact that, for any pair of random variables U, V over
the same sample space,
Pr
u∼U
[
ln
Pr[U = u]
Pr[V = u]
> k
]
≤ β
implies that
sup
T :Pr[U∈T ]>β
ln
Pr[U ∈ T ]− β
Pr[V ∈ T ] ≤ k.
5 Composition for Randomized Response
In this section, we give a direct proof showing that k instantiations of randomized response obey
privacy guarantees matching advanced composition, even under pure ε-LDP. Specifically, we exhibit
for every β > 0 an O(ε
√
k ln(1/β))-LDP algorithm that when run on any given input, yields a
distribution which is β-close in statistical distance to the composition of k instances of randomized
response.5 Prior work of Duchi, Jordan, and Wainwright [7] showed that the problem of estimating
k binary attributes admits an LDP algorithm with similar guarantees as ours. However, their
distribution does not resemble the k-fold composition of randomized response. We interpret our
new construction as evidence that an advanced composition theorem for pure ε-LDP might hold
for more general, and potentially even interactive mechanisms.
Let Mi : {0, 1}k → {0, 1} that performs randomized response on the ith bit of its input. On an
input x, our algorithm first identifies a “good” set Gx of outputs (y1, . . . , yk) ∈ {0, 1}k which have
roughly average likelihood of appearing under the composition M(x) = (M1(x), . . . ,Mk(x)). By
concentration arguments, M(x) produces an outcome in Gx with probability at least 1 − β. Our
approximate composed algorithm M˜(x) simply runs M(x), returns the outcome if it is in Gx, and
returns a uniformly random element outside Gx otherwise. The crux of the privacy argument is to
show that elements in this latter case end up being sampled with roughly the same probability as
elements in Gx.
5The usual guarantee of advanced composition also includes an additive O(ε2k) term, but our result only applies
to the typical setting where ε2k ≤ ε√k.
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Theorem 5.1. For each i = 1, . . . , k, let Mi : {0, 1}k → {0, 1} be the ε-differentially private
algorithm
Mi(x) =
{
xi w.p.
eε
eε+1
1− xi w.p. 1eε+1 .
Let 0 < β < (ε
√
k/2(k+ 1))2/3 and suppose ε˜ = 6ε
√
k ln(1/β) ≤ 1. Then there exists an algorithm
M˜ : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k such that
1. M˜ is ε˜-differentially private.
2. For every x ∈ {0, 1}k, there exists an event E with Pr[E] ≥ 1 − β such that, conditioned on
E, the output M˜(x) is identically distributed to M(x) = (M1(x), . . . ,Mk(x)).
Proof. Let M(x) = (M1(x), . . . ,Mk(x)). For strings x, y ∈ {0, 1}k, let dH(x, y) = |{i ∈ [k] : xi 6=
yi}| denote the Hamming distance between x and y. For each x ∈ {0, 1}k, define a “good” spherical
shell around x by
Gx =
{
y ∈ {0, 1}k : k
eε + 1
−
√
k ln(2/β)/2 ≤ dH(x, y) ≤ k
eε + 1
+
√
k ln(2/β)/2
}
It is immediate from Hoeffding’s inequality that Pr[M(x) ∈ Gx] ≤ β for all x ∈ {0, 1}k.
Our “approximate” composed algorithm is as follows.
Algorithm Approximate composed algorithm M˜(x)
1. Sample y = (y1, . . . , yk)←M(x)
2. If y ∈ Gx, output y;
Else, output a random sample from {0, 1}k \Gx.
Since Pr[M(x) ∈ Gx] ≥ 1 − β, the accuracy condition (2) in the statement of Theorem 5.1 is
immediate. We now show that Algorithm 2 guarantees ε˜-differential privacy. The main technical
lemma that we need to prove this is the following, which says that each y /∈ Gx is sampled with
probability close to the probability with which any item in Gx is sampled.
Lemma 5.2. For every x ∈ {0, 1}k and y /∈ Gx,
Pr[M˜(x) = y] ∈
[
e−3ε
√
k ln(1/β), e3ε
√
k ln(1/β)
]
·
(
1
eε + 1
)k/(eε+1)( eε
eε + 1
)k/(eε+1)
.
Proof. Let U be a uniform random variable on {0, 1}k. If y /∈ Gx, then
Pr[M˜(x) = y] = Pr[M(x) /∈ Gx] · 1|{0, 1}k \Gx|
= 2−k · Pr[M(x) /∈ Gx]
Pr[U /∈ Gx] .
To analyze this ratio, it suffices by symmetry to consider x = 0k, in which case the set of interest is
B = {0, 1}k\G0k =
{
y ∈ {0, 1}k : |y| < k
eε + 1
−
√
k ln(2/β)/2 or |y| > k
eε + 1
+
√
k ln(2/β)/2
}
.
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We further divide up B and consider the set R defined by
R =
{
y ∈ {0, 1}k : |y| < k
eε + 1
− 2
√
k ln(1/β) or |y| > k
eε + 1
+ 2
√
k ln(1/β)
}
.
Our strategy will be to show that for y ∈ B \R, the ratio Pr[M(0m) = y]/Pr[U = y] is roughly as
prescribed. Meanwhile, we will also have Pr[M(0m) ∈ R]  Pr[U ∈ B] and Pr[U ∈ R]  Pr[U ∈
B], so the contributions of points in B \R will dominate the ratio of interest.
More formally, we make use of the following two claims.
Claim 5.3. For every y ∈ B \R, we have
Pr[M(0m) = y]
Pr[U = y]
∈
[
e−2ε
√
k ln(1/β), e2ε
√
k ln(1/β)
]
· 2k ·
(
1
eε + 1
)k/(eε+1)( eε
eε + 1
)keε/(eε+1)
.
Claim 5.4. Both of the ratios
Pr[M(0m) ∈ R]
Pr[U ∈ B] ,
Pr[U ∈ R]
Pr[U ∈ B] ≤ (k + 1)β
3/2.
These claims are technical and unenlightening, so we defer them to the end of the proof. For
now, we show how to put them together to complete the proof of Lemma 5.2. Let
C = 2k ·
(
1
eε + 1
)k/(eε+1)( eε
eε + 1
)keε/(eε+1)
≥ 1.
Pr[M(0m) ∈ B] = Pr[M(0m) ∈ R] + Pr[M(0m) ∈ B \R]
≤ (k + 1)β3/2 Pr[U ∈ B] + e2ε
√
k ln(2/β) · C · Pr[U ∈ B \R]
≤ (e2ε
√
k ln(2/β) · C + (k + 1)β3/2) Pr[U ∈ B]
≤ e3ε
√
k ln(2/β) · C · Pr[U ∈ B].
Here, the last inequality follows because e2ε
√
k ln(2/β)+(k+1)β3/2 ≤ e3ε
√
k ln(2/β) when (k+1)β3/2 ≤
ε˜/12 ≤ ε√k ln(2/β)e2ε√k ln(2/β). Similarly,
Pr[M(0m) ∈ B] ≥ Pr[M(0m) ∈ B \R]
≥ e−2ε
√
k ln(2/β) · C · Pr[U ∈ B \R]
≥ e−2ε
√
k ln(2/β) · C · (Pr[U ∈ B]− (k + 1)β3/2 Pr[U ∈ B])
= e−2ε
√
k ln(2/β) · C · (1− (k + 1)β3/2) · Pr[U ∈ B]
≥ e−3ε
√
k ln(2/β) · C · Pr[U ∈ B],
where the last inequality holds because (k + 1)β3/2 ≤ ε˜/12 ≤ 1− e−ε
√
k ln(2/β). Thus we have
2−k · Pr[M(0
m) ∈ B]
Pr[U ∈ B] ∈
[
e−3ε
√
k ln(1/β), e3ε
√
k ln(1/β)
]
·
(
1
eε + 1
)k/(eε+1)( eε
eε + 1
)keε/(eε+1)
.
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.2.
We now use Lemma 5.2 to argue that M˜ is ε˜-differentially private. Fix two inputs x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}k.
We will show that for every y ∈ {0, 1}k, we have Pr[M˜(x) = y] ≤ eε˜ Pr[M˜(x′) = y]. There are four
cases to consider.
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Case 1. y ∈ Gx and y ∈ Gx′ . Here
Pr[M˜(x) = y]
Pr[M˜(x′) = y]
=
(
1
eε+1
)dH(x,y) ( eε
eε+1
)k−dH(x,y)
(
1
eε+1
)dH(x′,y) ( eε
eε+1
)k−dH(x′,y)
=
(
1
eε + 1
)dH(x,y)−dH(x′,y)( eε
eε + 1
)dH(x′,y)−dH(x,y)
≤
(
1
eε + 1
)−2√k ln(2/β)/2( eε
eε + 1
)2√k ln(2/β)/2
= eε
√
2k ln(2/β) ≤ eε˜.
Case 2. y ∈ Gx and y /∈ Gx′ . Here
Pr[M˜(x) = y]
Pr[M˜(x′) = y]
≤
(
1
eε+1
)dH(x,y) ( eε
eε+1
)k−dH(x,y)
e−3ε
√
k ln(2/β) ·
(
1
eε+1
)k/(eε+1) (
eε
eε+1
)keε/(eε+1)
= e3ε
√
k ln(2/β) ·
(
1
eε + 1
)dH(x,y)−k/(eε+1)( eε
eε + 1
)k/(eε+1)−dH(x,y)
≤ e3ε
√
k ln(2/β) ·
(
1
eε + 1
)−√k ln(2/β)/2( eε
eε + 1
)√k ln(2/β)/2
≤ e(3+
√
2)ε
√
k ln(2/β) ≤ eε˜.
Case 3. y /∈ Gx and y ∈ Gx′ . Here
Pr[M˜(x) = y]
Pr[M˜(x′) = y]
≤
e3ε
√
k ln(2/β) ·
(
1
eε+1
)k/(eε+1) (
eε
eε+1
)keε/(eε+1)
(
1
eε+1
)dH(x′,y) ( eε
eε+1
)k−dH(x′,y)
= e3ε
√
k ln(2/β) ·
(
1
eε + 1
)k/(eε+1)−dH(x′,y)( eε
eε + 1
)dH(x′,y)−k/(eε+1)
≤ e3ε
√
k ln(2/β) ·
(
1
eε + 1
)−√k ln(2/β)/2( eε
eε + 1
)√k ln(2/β)/2
= e(3+
√
2)ε
√
k ln(2/β) ≤ eε˜.
Case 4. y /∈ Gx and y /∈ Gx′ . Here
Pr[M˜(x) = y]
Pr[M˜(x′) = y]
≤
e3ε
√
k ln(2/β) ·
(
1
eε+1
)k/(eε+1) (
eε
eε+1
)keε/(eε+1)
e−3ε
√
k ln(2/β) ·
(
1
eε+1
)k/(eε+1) (
eε
eε+1
)keε/(eε+1)
= e6ε
√
k ln(2/β) ≤ eε˜.
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In all cases, we thus have Pr[M˜(x) = y] ≤ eε˜ Pr[M˜(x′) = y]. Modulo the deferred claims, this
completes the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Claim 5.3. Let y ∈ B \R. We first consider the case where
k
eε + 1
− 2
√
k ln(2/β) ≤ |y| ≤ k
eε + 1
−
√
k ln(2/β)/2.
Here, we have
Pr[M(0k) = y]
Pr[U = y]
= 2k
(
1
eε + 1
)|y|( eε
eε + 1
)k−|y|
= exp
(
ε ·
(
k
eε + 1
− |y|
))
· 2k ·
(
1
eε + 1
)k/(eε+1)( eε
eε + 1
)keε/(eε+1)
∈
[
1, e2ε
√
k ln(2/β)
]
· 2k ·
(
1
eε + 1
)k/(eε+1)( eε
eε + 1
)keε/(eε+1)
.
An identical argument shows that when
k
eε + 1
+
√
k ln(2/β)/2 ≤ |y| ≤ k
eε + 1
+ 2
√
k ln(2/β),
we have the relationship
Pr[M(0k) = y]
Pr[U = y]
∈
[
e−2ε
√
k ln(2/β), 1
]
· 2k ·
(
1
eε + 1
)k/(eε+1)( eε
eε + 1
)keε/(eε+1)
.
Before proving Claim 5.4, we state and prove the following anti-concentration result for uniform
strings.
Lemma 5.5. Let U be uniformly distributed on {0, 1}k. Then for every t ∈ [0,√k/2],
Pr
[
|U | ≥ k
2
+ t
√
k
]
≥ exp(−3t
2)
k + 1
.
Proof. Using the probability mass function of the binomial distribution, we calculate
Pr
[
|U | ≥ k
2
+ t
√
k
]
= 2−k
k/2−bt√kc∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
≥ 2−k
(
k
k/2− bt√kc
)
.
Using the consequence of Stirling’s approximation that
(
k
j
) ≥ 2k·H(j/k)/(k + 1) where H is the
binary entropy function, this is at least
2−k · 2
k·H(1/2−t/√k)
k + 1
.
Now we use the fact that H(1/2− η) ≥ 1− 4η2 to lower bound this by
2−4t2
k + 1
.
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Proof of Claim 5.4. By the lower bound of Lemma 5.5 on the tail bound of the uniform distribution,
Pr[U ∈ B] ≥ Pr
[
|U | > k
eε + 1
+
√
k ln(2/β)/2
]
= Pr
[
|U | > k
2
+
(√
ln(2/β)/2− (e
ε − 1)√k
2(eε + 1)
)√
k
]
≥ 1
k + 1
exp
−3 ·(√ln(2/β)/2− (eε − 1)√k
2(eε + 1)
)2 .
On the other hand, by Hoeffding’s inequality,
Pr[M(0m) ∈ R] ≤ 2 · exp
(
−2 · (2
√
ln(2/β))2
)
,
and
Pr[U ∈ R] ≤ 2 · exp
−2 ·(2√ln(2/β)− (eε − 1)√k
2(eε + 1)
)2 .
This allows us to conclude that both of the ratios Pr[M(0m) ∈ R]/Pr[U ∈ B] and Pr[U ∈
R]/Pr[U ∈ B] are at most
2(k + 1) · exp
−13
2
ln(2/β) + (8− 3
√
2)
√
ln(2/β) · (e
ε − 1)√k
2(eε + 1)
+
(
(eε − 1)√k
2(eε + 1)
)2 .
Using the fact that (eε − 1)√k/2(eε + 1) ≤√ln(2/β), this is at most
2(k + 1) · exp
(
−3
2
ln(2/β)
)
≤ (k + 1) · β3/2.
6 From Approximate-Privacy to Pure-Privacy: A Generic Trans-
formation with Short Reports
In this section we present our generic transformation from any (non-interactive) (ε, δ)-LDP protocol
into an O(ε)-LDP protocol with essentially the same utility guarantees. Our transformation is based
on rejection sampling, an idea that first appeared in the context of differential privacy in work of
Kasiviswanathan et al. [19], where it was used to show an equivalence between the local model
(under pure-privacy) and SQ learning. Rejection sampling was also used by Bassily and Smith [4]
to show that almost any (non-interactive) ε-LDP protocol can be transformed into a protocol where
the communication per user is only 1 bit (at the expense of increasing the shared randomness in
the protocol). Our transformation is obtained from the transformation of Bassily and Smith with
the following two modifications:
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1. The transformation of Bassily and Smith applies to any “sample resilient” ε-LDP protocol.
Informally, a sample resilient protocol is one whose outcome on any (distributed) database
S is well-approximated by its outcome on a random subset of (roughly) half of the users in
S. While we do not know of any protocols which are not sample resilient, we would like to
obtain a more general result which avoids this restriction. We show that this restriction can
be removed at the expense of increasing per-user communication to O(log log n), where n is
the number of users.
2. We generalize the transformation so that it also holds for any (ε, δ)-LDP protocol. Somewhat
surprisingly, instead of obtaining an (ε, δ)-LDP protocol with short user reports, we show
that, when done carefully, the resulting protocol actually satisfies pure O(ε)-privacy.
Our generic transformation is given in algorithm GenProt.
Algorithm GenProt
Inputs: User’s inputs {xi ∈ X : i ∈ [n]}, privacy parameter ε, and parameter T ∈ N.
Algorithms used: An (ε, δ)-LDP protocol M with local randomizers Ai, i ∈ [n].
1. For every (i, t) ∈ [n]×[T ] generate independent public string: yi,t ← Ai(⊥).
2. For user i = 1 to n do
(a) For every t ∈ [T ] compute pi,t = 12
Pr[Ai(xi)=yi,t]
Pr[Ai(⊥)=yi,t] .
(b) For every t ∈ [T ], if pi,t /∈
[
e−2ε
2 ,
e2ε
2
]
then set pi,t =
1
2 .
(c) For every t ∈ [T ] sample a bit bi,t from Bernoulli(pi,t).
(d) Denote Hi = {t ∈ [T ] : bi,t = 1}.
(e) If Hi = ∅ then set Hi = [T ].
(f) Sample gi ∈ Hi uniformly, and send gi to the server.
3. Run M(y1,g1 , . . . , yn,gn).
Theorem 6.1. Let ε ≤ 1/4, and let
5 ln(1/ε) ≤ T ≤ 1− e
−ε
4δeεn
.
Then Algorithm GenProt satisfies 10ε-LDP. Moreover, for every database S = (x1, . . . , xn), the
total variation distance between GenProt(S) and M(S) is at most
sup
T
|Pr[GenProt(S) ∈ T ]− Pr[M(S) ∈ T ]| ≤ n
((
1
2
+ ε
)T
+
6Tδeε
1− e−ε
)
.
To interpret the guarantee of this theorem, let β > 0 be a parameter, and suppose δ ≤
εβ/48n ln(2n/β). Then setting T = 2 ln(2n/β) makes this total variation distance at most β.
With this setting of parameters, observe that each user must send O(log log n) bits to the server.
We prove the privacy and utility guarantees of Theorem 6.1 individually.
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Lemma 6.2. Let ε ≤ 1/4 and let T ≥ 5 ln(1/ε). Then Algorithm GenProt satisfies 10ε-LDP.
Proof. Fix the public randomness yi,t for (i, t)∈[n]×[T ]. Fix a user i ∈ [n], and let Qi denote the
output of user i in the protocol (from step 2f) after fixing the public randomness. Let xi, x
′
i ∈ X
be two possible inputs, and let g ∈ [T ] be a possible output of Qi. Our goal is to show that
Pr[Qi(xi) = g] ≤ e10ε · Pr[Qi(x′i) = g].
We calculate:
Pr[Qi(xi) = g] = Pr[bi,g = 1] · Pr[Qi(xi) = g|bi,g = 1] + Pr[bi,g = 0] · Pr[Qi(xi) = g|bi,g = 0]. (5)
We now analyze each of these two terms. First observe that if bi,g = 0, then for g to be a
possible output it must be that Hi = ∅ before step 2e, and that the output is chosen uniformly
from Hi = [T ]. So,
Pr[Qi(xi) = g|bi,g = 0] = 1
T
· Pr[∀t 6= g we have bi,t = 0] ≤ 1
T
(
e2ε
2
)T−1
.
Next note that if bi,g = 1 then we have that Hi 6= ∅ before step 2e, and that the output is chosen
uniformly from Hi. So,
Pr[Qi(xi) = g|bi,g = 1] =
T∑
k=1
Pr[|Hi| = k|bi,g = 1] · 1
k
=
T∑
k=1
Pr[|Hi \ {g}| = k − 1] · 1
k
=
T−1∑
k=0
Pr[|Hi \ {g}| = k] · 1
k + 1
= E
[
1
W + 1
]
, (6)
where W , |Hi\{g}| =
∑
t6=q bi,t is a sum of independent Bernoulli random variables, with different
expectations pi,t ∈
[
e−2ε
2 ,
e2ε
2
]
(this is called the Poisson binomial distribution). We now want to
relate the random variable W to the binomial distribution, specifically, to a random variable Wˆ
defined as the sum of (T − 1) i.i.d. Bernoullis with expectations pˆ = e−2ε2 . This is useful as the
binomial distribution is much easier to analyze than the Poisson binomial distribution.
Our current task is to show that E[1/(W + 1)] ≤ E[1/(Wˆ + 1)]. Intuitively, observe that W
is the sum of T − 1 Bernoullis: W = ∑t6=q bi,t, and recall that we defined Wˆ by decreasing the
expectations of each of these Bernoulli random variables. Hence, intuitively we should get that
E[1/(W + 1)] ≤ E[1/(Wˆ + 1)]. We now make this argument formal.
Claim 6.3. Let X ∼ Bernoulli(p) and Xˆ ∼ Bernoulli(pˆ) where p ≥ pˆ. Let Y ≥ 1 be independent
of X, Xˆ. Then E
[
1
X+Y
]
≤ E
[
1
Xˆ+Y
]
.
Proof.
E
[
1
X + Y
]
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr
[
1
X + Y
≥ z
]
dz =
∫ ∞
0
∑
y
Pr[Y = y] Pr
[
1
X + y
≥ z
]
dz
≤
∫ ∞
0
∑
y
Pr[Y = y] Pr
[
1
Xˆ + y
≥ z
]
dz = E
[
1
Xˆ + Y
]
.
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Using Claim 6.3 we can replace, one by one, every Bernoulli(p) variable in the sum of W with
a Bernoulli(pˆ) variable, without decreasing the expectation E[1/(W + 1)]. So,
(6) ≤ E[1/(Wˆ + 1)] =
T−1∑
k=0
1
k + 1
(
T − 1
k
)
· pˆk · (1− pˆ)T−1−k
=
T−1∑
k=0
1
k + 1
(T − 1)!
k!(T − 1− k)! · pˆ
k · (1− pˆ)T−1−k
=
T−1∑
k=0
1
T
T !
(k + 1)!(T − 1− k)! · pˆ
k · (1− pˆ)T−1−k
=
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(
T
k + 1
)
· pˆk · (1− pˆ)T−1−k
=
1
T
T∑
`=1
(
T
`
)
· pˆ`−1 · (1− pˆ)T−`
=
1
T pˆ
T∑
`=1
(
T
`
)
· pˆ` · (1− pˆ)T−`
=
1
T pˆ
[
− (1− pˆ)T +
T∑
`=0
(
T
`
)
· pˆ` · (1− pˆ)T−`
]
=
1
T pˆ
[
− (1− pˆ)T + 1
]
=
2
Te−2ε
[
1−
(
1− e
−2ε
2
)T]
.
Going back to Equation (5) we have that
Pr[Qi(xi) = g] = Pr[bi,g = 1] · Pr[Qi(xi) = g|bi,g = 1] + Pr[bi,g = 0] · Pr[Qi(xi) = g|bi,g = 0]
≤ e
2ε
2
· 2
Te−2ε
[
1−
(
1− e
−2ε
2
)T]
+
e2ε
2
· 1
T
(
e2ε
2
)T−1
=
1
T
[
e4ε − e4ε
(
1− e
−2ε
2
)T
+
(
e2ε
2
)T]
≤ 1
T
[
e4ε +
(
e2ε
2
)T]
An identical analysis shows that
Pr[Qi(x′i) = g] ≥
1
T
[
e−4ε − e−4ε
(
1− e
2ε
2
)T]
.
So,
Pr[Qi(xi) = g]
Pr[Qi(x′i) = g]
≤
e4ε +
(
e2ε
2
)T
e−4ε − e−4ε
(
1− e2ε2
)T ,
which is at most e10ε for ε ≤ 1/4 and T ≥ 5 ln(1/ε).
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Lemma 6.4. Let T ≤ 1−e−ε4δeεn . Then any event that occurs with probability p under the original
protocol happens with probability at most
p+ n
((
1
2
+ ε
)T
+
6Tδeε
1− e−ε
)
in the execution of GenProt.
Proof. Fix user inputs x1, . . . , xn. For (i, t) ∈ [n]×[T ] we denote by Yi,t the random variable taking
value yi,t in line 1 of GenProt. We also denote Yi = Yi,Gi , where Gi is a random variable taking
value gi in line 2f of GenProt. With these notations, our goal is to relate the following two random
variables:
M(A1(x1), . . . ,An(xn)) and M(Y1, . . . , Yn).
To that end, we now define the following events:
Event E: For every i ∈ [n] we have that Hi 6= ∅ before step 2e.
Event Ei: We have that Hi 6= ∅ before step 2e.
We show that E happens with high probability. Fix i ∈ [n]. For ε ≤ 14 and β = n(1/2 + ε)T we
have
Pr[Hi = ∅] ≤
(
1− e
−2ε
2
)T
≤
(
1
2
+ ε
)T
≤ β
n
.
Hence, using the union bound, we get that Pr[E] ≥ 1− β.
For every i ∈ [n] define the set of all “good” random strings Goodi =
{
y : Pr[Ai(xi)=y]Pr[Ai(⊥)=y] ∈ e±2ε
}
.
Event Priv: For every i ∈ [n] and for every t ∈ [T ] we have that Yi,t ∈ Goodi.
Event Privi: For every t ∈ [T ] we have that Yi,t ∈ Goodi.
Event Privi,t: We have that Yi,t ∈ Goodi.
To analyze Event Priv we recall the following useful consequence of the definition of differential
privacy:
Observation 6.5 ([20]). Let M :Xn→Y be (ε, δ)-differentially private, and fix neighboring databases
S, S′∈Xn. Then,
Pr
[
M(S) = y s.t.
Pr[M(S) = y]
Pr[M(S′) = y]
/∈ e±2ε
]
≤ 2δe
ε
1− e−ε = O(δ/ε).
By Observation 6.5 and a union bound for every (i, t) ∈ [n]×[T ] we have that Pr[Priv] ≥
1− 2nTδeε
1−e−ε .
For (i, t) ∈ [n]×[T ] let Bi,t be a random variable taking value bi,t in line 2c of GenProt. Fix
i ∈ [n] and fix y ∈ Goodi. We calculate:
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Pr[Yi = y|E,Priv] = Pr[Yi = y|Ei,Privi]
=
∑
t∈[T ]
Pr[Gi = t|Ei,Privi] · Pr[Yi = y|Gi = t, Ei,Privi]
=
∑
t∈[T ]
Pr[Gi = t|Ei,Privi] · Pr[Yi,t = y|Gi = t, Bi,t = 1,Privi]
=
∑
t∈[T ]
Pr[Gi = t|Ei,Privi] · Pr[Yi,t = y,Gi = t, Bi,t = 1,Privi]
Pr[Gi = t, Bi,t = 1,Privi]
=
∑
t∈[T ]
Pr[Gi = t|Ei,Privi] · Pr[Gi = t|Yi,t = y,Bi,t = 1,Privi]
Pr[Gi = t|Bi,t = 1,Privi] · Pr[Yi,t = y|Bi,t = 1,Privi]
(7)
Now recall that Gi is a (random) function of Bi,1, . . . , Bi,T , and observe that given Bi,t = 1, we
have that Gi is independent of Yi,t. Hence,
(7) =
∑
t∈[T ]
Pr[Gi = t|Ei,Privi] · Pr[Yi,t = y|Bi,t = 1,Privi]
=
∑
t∈[T ]
Pr[Gi = t|Ei,Privi] · Pr[Yi,1 = y|Bi,1 = 1,Privi,1]
= Pr[Yi,1 = y|Bi,1 = 1,Privi,1] ·
∑
t∈[T ]
Pr[Gi = t|Ei,Privi]
= Pr[Yi,1 = y|Bi,1 = 1,Privi,1]
=
Pr[Yi,1 = y,Bi,1 = 1,Privi,1]
Pr[Bi,1 = 1,Privi,1]
(8)
Recall that we fixed y s.t. y ∈ Goodi. Hence,
(8) =
Pr[Yi,1 = y,Bi,1 = 1]
Pr[Bi,1 = 1,Privi,1]
=
Pr[Yi,1 = y] · Pr[Bi,1 = 1|Yi,1 = y]
Pr[Bi,1 = 1,Privi,1]
=
Pr[Yi,1 = y] · 12 Pr[Ai(xi)=y]Pr[Yi,1=y]
Pr[Bi,1 = 1,Privi,1]
=
1
2 Pr[Ai(xi) = y]
Pr[Bi,1 = 1,Privi,1]
(9)
We now analyze Pr[Bi,1 = 1,Privi,1]:
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Pr[Bi,1 = 1,Privi,1] =
∑
y∈Goodi
Pr[Yi,1 = y] · Pr[Bi,1 = 1|Yi,1 = y]
=
∑
y∈Goodi
Pr[Yi,1 = y] · 1
2
Pr[Ai(xi) = y]
Pr[Yi,1 = y]
=
1
2
∑
y∈Goodi
Pr[Ai(xi) = y] = 1
2
Pr[Ai(xi) ∈ Goodi].
Hence, as y ∈ Goodi, we have
(9) =
Pr[Ai(xi) = y]
Pr[Ai(xi) ∈ Goodi] = Pr[Ai(xi) = y | Ai(xi) ∈ Goodi].
That is, we have established that for every i ∈ [n] and for every y ∈ Goodi the following holds:
Pr[Yi = y|E,Priv] = Pr[Ai(xi) = y | Ai(xi) ∈ Goodi].
Let us denote Good = Good1× Good2× . . .× Goodn. For simplicity we now assume that the
post-processing procedure M is deterministic. For a subset F of possible outputs of M we denote
FY = {(y1, . . . , yn) :M(y1, . . . , yn) ∈ F}.
With this notation we have that
Pr[M(Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ F ] ≤ Pr[E] + Pr[Priv] + Pr[M(Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ F |E,Priv]
≤ β + 2nTδe
ε
1− e−ε + Pr[M(Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ F |E,Priv]
= β +
2nTδeε
1− e−ε +
∑
(y1,...,yn)∈FY
Pr[Y1 = y1, . . . , Yn = yn|E,Priv]
= β +
2nTδeε
1− e−ε +
∑
(y1,...,yn)∈FY
n∏
i=1
Pr[Yi = yi|E,Priv]
= β +
2nTδeε
1− e−ε +
∑
(y1,...,yn)∈FY ∩Good
n∏
i=1
Pr[Yi = yi|E,Priv]
= β +
2nTδeε
1− e−ε +
∑
(y1,...,yn)∈FY ∩Good
n∏
i=1
Pr[Ai(xi) = yi | Ai(xi) ∈ Goodi]
= β +
2nTδeε
1− e−ε +
∑
(y1,...,yn)∈FY
n∏
i=1
Pr[Ai(xi) = yi | Ai(xi) ∈ Goodi] (10)
Let us use the shorthand
{
~A(~x) ∈ Good
}
to denote {A1(x1) ∈ Good1, . . . ,An(xn) ∈ Goodn}. So,
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(11) = β +
2nTδeε
1− e−ε +
∑
(y1,...,yn)∈FY
Pr[A1(x1) = y1, . . . ,An(xn) = yn| ~A(~x) ∈ Good]
= β +
2nTδeε
1− e−ε + Pr[M(A1(x1), . . . ,An(xn)) ∈ F |
~A(~x) ∈ Good]
≤ β + 2nTδe
ε
1− e−ε +
1
Pr[ ~A(~x) ∈ Good] · Pr[M(A1(x1), . . . ,An(xn)) ∈ F ] (11)
Similarly to the analysis of Event Priv, by the privacy properties of the Ai’s we have that
Pr[ ~A(~x) ∈ Good] ≥ 1− 2nTδeε
1−e−ε . Using the fact that
1
1−ζ ≤ 1 + 2ζ for every 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 12 , and ensuring
that 2nTδe
ε
1−e−ε ≤ 12 , we get
(11) ≤ β + 2nTδe
ε
1− e−ε +
(
1 +
4nTδeε
1− e−ε
)
· Pr[M(A1(x1), . . . ,An(xn)) ∈ F ]
≤ β + 6nTδe
ε
1− e−ε + Pr[M(A1(x1), . . . ,An(xn)) ∈ F ]
This shows that GenProt increases the probability of any event by at most β + 6nTδe
ε
1−e−ε .
7 A Lower Bound via Anti-Concentration
In Section 3 we presented a LDP heavy-hitters algorithm with error O
(
1
ε
√
n · log
( |X|
β
))
. Ignoring
the dependence on β, this error is known to be optimal. Specifically, Bassily and Smith [4] proved
the following lower bound:
Theorem 7.1 ([4]). Let ε = O(1) and δ = o
(
1
n logn
)
. Every non-interactive (ε, δ)-LDP pro-
tocol for estimating the frequencies of elements from a domain X must have worst-case error
Ω
(
1
ε
√
n · log |X|
)
with constant probability.
In this section we incorporate a tight dependence on the failure probability β into the lower
bound. Specifically, we show
Theorem 7.2. Let ε = O(1) and δ = o
(
1
n logn
)
. Every non-interactive (ε, δ)-LDP protocol for es-
timating the frequencies of elements from a domain X achieving worst-case error ∆ with probability
at least 1− β must have
∆ ≥ Ω
(
1
ε
√
n · log
( |X|
β
))
.
In light of Theorem 7.1, we can fix X = {0, 1} and only show a lower bound of Ω
(
1
ε
√
n · log( 1β )
)
.
To that end, we now strengthen an argument of Chan et al. [6] (see also [17, 34]) who obtained a
lower bound of Ω(
√
n) on the error:
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Theorem 7.3 ([6, 17, 34]). Let ε ≤ 1/2 and δ < 1. Every (ε, δ)-LDP frequency oracle must have
worst-case error Ω(
√
n) with constant probability.
Before presenting the proof of Theorem 7.2, we establish some notation, and present a high-level
overview of the proof. In this overview, we argue how the result follows from the ideas presented
in the previous sections; namely, from advanced grouposition and from our generic transformation
from approximate to pure LDP. However, we will present the complete proof in a somewhat more
streamlined way that does not go through these generic results.
By our transformation from approximate to pure LDP, we may assume without loss of generality
that we have a pure ε-LDP protocol A for n users, which for every (distributed) database D ∈
{0, 1}n counts the number of 1’s in D to within error ∆ with success probability 1 − β. Our goal
is to show that ∆ = Ω
(
1
ε
√
n · log( 1β )
)
.
We generate an input to A as follows: For some constant C > 0, denote m = Cε2n, and
let S = (X1, . . . , Xm) ∈ {0, 1}m be a database chosen uniformly at random. Now define D =
(Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ {0, 1}n, where Yi = Xdim/ne. That is, the first nm elements in D are X1, the next
n
m elements are X2, and so on. Now consider applying the protocol A onto the database D. The
remainder of the proof proceeds as follows:
(i) On one hand, the error of A on D is at most ∆, and hence, renormalizing to S, we obtain an
estimate of the number of 1’s in S with error at most mn ∆ = Cε
2∆.
(ii) On the other hand, every bit in S has nm =
1
Cε2
copies in D. By advanced grouposition, we
provide every element in S with say ( 1100 ,
1
100)-DP. Using bounds on the mutual information
of a random input and the output of a DP algorithm [4], we get that (a lot of) the elements
in S remain approximately uniform even conditioned on the transcript of the protocol (and
they also remain independent).
Combining (i) and (ii), and applying an anti-concentration bound to the sum of elements in S, we
will get that
Cε2∆ &
√
|S| · log
(
1
β
)
=
√
Cε2n · log
(
1
β
)
,
which gives the result. We now present a full proof Theorem 7.2 which is based on these ideas, but
does not need to go through our generic transformations.
Proof of Theorem 7.2. Assume that we have an (ε, δ)-LDP protocol A for n users, that for every
(distributed) database D ∈ {0, 1}n counts the number of 1’s in D to within error ∆ with success
probability 1 − β. We generate an input to A as follows: For some constant C > 0, denote
m = Cε2n, and let S = (X1, . . . , Xm) ∈ {0, 1}m be a database chosen uniformly at random. Now
define D = (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∈ {0, 1}n, where Yi = Xdim/ne. That is, the first nm elements in D are X1,
the next nm elements are X2, and so on.
Consider the execution of protocol A on the database D = (Y1, . . . , Yn), and let R denote
public randomness generated by the server. For i ∈ [n], let Ai(R, ·) denote the (ε, δ)-differentially
private algorithm which acts on the bit Yi, and let Ai be a random variable denoting the outcome
of Ai(R, Yi). With this notation, we have that the outcome of the protocol is a deterministic
function of T = (R,A1, . . . , An), which we call the transcript of the protocol. For each fixed
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choice of T = t we denote the outcome of the protocol as EstD(t). We also denote by EstS(t) =
m
n EstD(t) the renormalized estimate of the number of 1’s in S. Observe that for every fixing of
X1=x1, . . . , Xm=xm and Y1=y1, . . . , Yn=yn we have∣∣∣∣∣EstD(t)−
n∑
i=1
yi
∣∣∣∣∣ = mn ·
∣∣∣∣∣EstS(t)−
m∑
i=1
xi
∣∣∣∣∣ . (12)
By construction, every bit Xj ∈ S is used by the nm mechanisms
A(j−1) n
m
+1,A(j−1) n
m
+2, . . . ,Aj nm .
We abbreviate
Bj(r,Xj) = (A(j−1) n
m
+1(r,Xj), . . . ,Aj nm (r,Xj)).
That is, Bj(r,Xj) is the vector of outcomes of the nm mechanisms that operate on Xj when the
server’s randomness is R = r. Let C2 > 1 be a constant, and recall that m = Cε
2n. By choosing
C = C(C2) to be a large enough constant we have that Bj(r, ·) satisfies ( 1C2 , 1C2 )-differential privacy
for every choice of r (see advanced composition in [11]). We now use the following theorem to argue
that, for every r, the mutual information between Xj and Bj(r,Xj) is low:
Theorem 7.4 ([4]). Let V be uniformly distributed over {0, 1}d. Let Q : {0, 1}d → Z be an
(ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm, and let Z denote Q(V ). Then, we have that
I(V ;Z) = O
(
ε2 +
δd
ε
+
δ
ε
log(ε/δ)
)
.
Recall that Xj is uniform in {0, 1}, and that Bj(r, ·) satisfies ( 1C2 , 1C2 )-differential privacy. Hence,
by choosing C2 to be a large enough constant, for every j ∈ [m] we have that I(Xj ;Bj(r,Xj)) ≤ 110 ,
so
H(Xj |Bj(r,Xj)) = H(Xj)− I(Xj ;Bj(r,Xj)) ≥ 9
10
.
Recall that H(Xj |Bj(r,Xj)) is defined as the average of H(Xj |Bj(r,Xj) = bj) over all possible
values bj in the range of Bj(r, ·). So,
9
10
≤
∑
bj
Pr[Bj(r,Xj) = bj ] ·H(Xj |Bj(r,Xj) = bj)
≤
∑
bj :H(Xj |Bj(r,Xj)=bj)≥ 12
Pr[Bj(r,Xj) = bj ] +
∑
bj :H(Xj |Bj(r,Xj)=bj)< 12
Pr[Bj(r,Xj) = bj ] · 1
2
= Pr
[
Bj(r,Xj) = bj s.t. H(Xj |Bj(r,Xj) = bj) ≥ 1
2
]
+
1
2
· Pr
[
Bj(r,Xj) = bj s.t. H(Xj |Bj(r,Xj) = bj) < 1
2
]
≤ Pr
[
Bj(r,Xj) = bj s.t. H(Xj |Bj(r,Xj) = bj) ≥ 1
2
]
+
1
2
.
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Let t = (r, a1, . . . , an) be a possible transcript, and let bj denote the portion of t corresponding
to Bj , that is, bj = (a(j−1) n
m
+1, . . . , aj
n
m). We say that index j ∈ [m] is good for the transcript t if
H(Xj |Bj(r,Xj) = bj) ≥ 1/2.
Then, for every r and every j ∈ [m], we have that
Pr[T = t s.t. j is good for t|R = r] = Pr
[
Bj(r,Xj) = bj s.t. H(Xj |Bj(r,Xj) = bj) ≥ 1
2
]
≥ 2
5
,
where the second probability is only over Xj and the coins of Bj(r,Xj). Consider the following
event:
Event E1 (over sampling S ∈ {0, 1}m and the execution of A):
T = t s.t. there are at least m5 choices for j ∈ [m] which are good for t.
For every fixture of R = r, by the Chernoff bound, assuming that m ≥ 20 ln(3/β), we have that
Pr[E1|R = r] ≥ 1− β3 . Hence, Pr[E1] ≥ 1− β3 . We continue with the proof assuming that event E1
occurs.
Fix a transcript t = (r, a1, . . . , an), and let j be a good index for t. We have that bj is s.t.
H(Xj |Bj(r,Xj) = bj) ≥ 1/2. Hence,
1
10
≤ Pr[Xj = 1|Bj(r,Xj) = bj ] ≤ 9
10
.
Now observe that the executions of Bj(r, ·) are independent across different j’s, and are independent
of the server’s randomness R (since we fixed r in Bj(r, ·)). Hence
Xj |Bj(r,Xj)=bj ≡ Xj |T=t.
So we also have that 110 ≤ Pr[Xj = 1|T = t] ≤ 910 , and hence,
Var[Xj |T = t] ≥ 9/100.
Moreover, for every choice of t it holds that the random variables (X1|T=t), (X2|T=t), . . . , (Xm|T=t)
are independent (this is a general fact about interactive protocols – if the parties’ inputs start in-
dependent, they remain independent conditioned on the transcript).
Fix a transcript t. As event E1 has occurred, there is a set G ⊆ [m] of size m5 of good indexes
for t. We now use the following anti-concentration theorem to argue about
(∑
i∈M Xi | T=t
)
.
Theorem 7.5. [13, 23] There exist constants a, b > 0 s.t. the following holds. Let X be a sum of
independent random variables, each attaining values in [0, 1], and let σ =
√
Var[X] ≥ 200. Then
for all t ∈
[
0, σ
2
100
]
, we have
Pr [X ≥ E[X] + t] ≥ a · e−bt2/σ2 .
An immediate corollary of this theorem is following:
Corollary 7.6. There exist constants a, b, c > 0 s.t. the following holds. Let X be a sum of
independent random variables, each attaining values in [0, 1], and let σ =
√
Var[X] ≥ 200. Then
for every a ≥ β ≥ 2−bσ2 and every interval I ∈ R of length |I| ≤ c ·
√
σ2 · log( aβ ) we have
Pr [X /∈ I] ≥ β.
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For completeness, we give in Appendix A a simple proof of a weaker version of corollary that
suffices for our application. Applying Corollary 7.6 to the random variables (Xj |T=t) for j ∈ G,
we get that there are constants a, b, c > 0 s.t. for every a ≥ β ≥ 2−bε2n and every interval I ∈ R of
length |I| ≤ c ·
√
ε2n · log( aβ ) it holds that
Pr
[∑
i∈G
Xi /∈ I
∣∣∣∣∣T=t
]
≥ 2β. (13)
Recall that, even conditioned on T=t, the random variablesX1, . . . , Xm are independent. Hence,
Inequality (13) also holds for the sum of all Xj (since Inequality 13 holds for every fixed choice of
{Xj : j /∈ G}). That is,
Pr
 ∑
i∈[m]
Xi /∈ I
∣∣∣∣∣∣T=t
 ≥ 2β.
In particular, consider the interval I(t) = EstS(t)± c2 ·
√
ε2n · log
(
a
β
)
. We have that
Pr
∣∣∣∣∣∣EstS(T )−
∑
i∈[m]
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > c2 ·
√
ε2n · log
(
a
β
) = Pr
∑
i∈[m]
Xi /∈ I(T )

≥ Pr[E1] · Pr
 ∑
i∈[m]
Xi /∈ I(T )
∣∣∣∣∣∣E1

≥
(
1− β
3
)
· 2β > β.
And finally, using Equation (12),
Pr
∣∣∣∣∣∣EstD(T )−
∑
i∈[n]
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > c2Cε ·
√
n · log
(
a
β
) > β.
That is, with probability greater than β the protocol has error at least Ω
(
1
ε
√
n · log
(
1
β
))
when
estimating the number of ones in the random database D ∈ {0, 1}n. Hence, there must exist some
fixed database on which it has error Ω
(
1
ε
√
n · log
(
1
β
))
with probability greater than β.
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A Simple Variant of Corollary 7.6
In Section 7 we used the following anti-concentration result:
Corollary 7.6 ([13, 23]). There exist constants a, b, c > 0 s.t. the following holds. Let X be a sum
of independent random variables, each attaining values in [0, 1], and let σ =
√
Var[X] ≥ 200. Then
for every a ≥ β ≥ 2−bσ2 and every interval I ∈ R of length |I| ≤ c ·
√
σ2 · log( aβ ) we have
Pr [X /∈ I] ≥ β.
This result has relatively simple proofs in the special case where X is the sum of i.i.d. random
variables (see, e.g., [21]). However, we were unable to find a reference with a simple analysis for the
case where the variables are independent but not necessarily identically distributed. In particular,
the results of Feller [13] are quite involved, as they are much more general than Corollary 7.6. In
this section we provide a simple analysis for a special case of Corollary 7.6 that suffices for our
applications in Section 7.
Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent random variables, each attaining values in {0, 1}, and denote
pi = Pr[Xi = 1]. We assume that, for some constant c ∈ (0, 12), for all i ∈ [n] we have that
1
2 − c ≤ pi ≤ 12 + c.
Our goal is to show that for any interval I of length |I| ≤ O
(√
n · log( 1β )
)
it holds that
Pr[
∑
iXi /∈ I] ≥ β. The first step is to relate the situation to the easier-to-analyze case of i.i.d.
random variables, using the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. Let X,Y be independent random variables, where Y ∈ R and X ∈ {0, 1} with
1
2 − c ≤ p = E[X] ≤ 12 + c. Also let X+, X− ∈ {0, 1} be independent of Y s.t. p+ = E[X+] = 12 + c
and p− = E[X−] = 12 − c. Then for every interval I ⊆ R we have,
Pr[X + Y /∈ I] ≥ min{Pr[X+ + Y /∈ I],Pr[X− + Y /∈ I]} .
Proof.
Pr[X + Y /∈ I] =
∑
y∈R
Pr
Y
[Y = y] · Pr
X
[X + y /∈ I]
= Pr
Y
 Y + 1 /∈ Iand
Y /∈ I
 · 1 + Pr
Y
 Y + 1 /∈ Iand
Y ∈ I

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expression A
·p+ Pr
Y
 Y + 1 ∈ Iand
Y /∈ I

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expression B
·(1− p).
(14)
37
Trivially, one of these two expressions is greater or equal to the other. Let us define p˜ to be p˜ = 12−c
if A ≥ B, and p˜ = 12 +c otherwise. Furthermore, let X˜ ∈ {0, 1} be s.t. E[X˜] = p˜. With this notation
we have that
(14) ≥ Pr
Y
 Y + 1 /∈ Iand
Y /∈ I
 · 1 + Pr
Y
 Y + 1 /∈ Iand
Y ∈ I
 · p˜+ Pr
Y
 Y + 1 ∈ Iand
Y /∈ I
 · (1− p˜)
= Pr[X˜ + Y /∈ I] ≥ min{Pr[X+ + Y /∈ I],Pr[X− + Y /∈ I]} .
Consider again our independent random variables X1, . . . , Xn ∈ {0, 1}, and let I ⊆ R be an
interval. Using Lemma A.1 we can replace, one-by-one, every variable Xi with a variable X˜i with
expectation either 12 +c or
1
2−c (exactly), without decreasing the probability that
∑
iXi /∈ I. That
is, we have established the following statement.
Corollary A.2. Let X1, . . . , Xn ∈ {0, 1} be independent, where 12 − c ≤ pi = E[Xi] ≤ 12 + c. For
every interval I ⊆ R there exist a collection of n independent random variables X˜1, . . . , X˜n ∈ {0, 1}
where E[X˜i] = p˜i ∈ {12 + c, 12 − c}, such that
Pr
[∑
i
Xi /∈ I
]
≥ Pr
[∑
i
X˜i /∈ I
]
.
So, we have a collection of n random variables X˜1, . . . , X˜n of two possible types (either p˜i =
1
2 +c
or p˜i =
1
2 − c). Clearly, at least one type appears at least n/2 times. We hence let G ⊆ [n] denote
a set of size n/2 s.t. for all i ∈ G we have that X˜i are of the same type. We can now apply again
Lemma A.1 to our random variables X˜1, . . . , X˜n, and for every i /∈ G replace X˜i with a constant 0
or 1 (this amounts to shifting the interval I). This brings us to the following corollary:
Corollary A.3. Let X1, . . . , Xn ∈ {0, 1} be independent, where 12 − c ≤ pi = E[Xi] ≤ 12 + c. For
every interval I ⊆ R there exist an interval Iˆ ⊆ R of the same length |Iˆ| = |I| and pˆ ∈ {12 +c, 12−c}
s.t. the following holds.
Pr
[∑
i
Xi /∈ I
]
≥ Pr
[
Bin
(n
2
, pˆ
)
/∈ Iˆ
]
.
The result now follows from anti-concentration bounds for the Binomial distribution. For in-
stance, we can apply the following bound.
Theorem A.4 ([21, Lemma 5.2]). Let 0 < p ≤ 12 , and let
√
3np ≤ t ≤ np/2. Then,
Pr [Bin(n, p) ≤ np− t] ≥ exp
(
−9t
2
np
)
,
Pr [Bin(n, p) ≥ np+ t] ≥ exp
(
−9t
2
np
)
.
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To complete the proof, let I ⊆ R be an interval of length at most t. Let Iˆ = [aˆ, bˆ] and pˆ be as
in Corollary A.3. We have that
Pr
[
Bin
(n
2
, pˆ
)
/∈ Iˆ
]
= Pr
[
Bin
(n
2
, pˆ
)
< aˆ
]
+ Pr
[
Bin
(n
2
, pˆ
)
> bˆ
]
. (15)
There are two cases: Either pˆ = 12 − c or pˆ = 12 + c. As the two cases are symmetric, we now
proceed assuming that pˆ = 12 − c.
Recall that the median of Bin
(
n
2 , pˆ
)
is between bnpˆ2 c and dnpˆ2 e. Hence, if bˆ ≤ npˆ2 − 1, then
Pr
[
Bin
(
n
2 , pˆ
)
> bˆ
]
≥ 12 and the proof is complete. We therefore proceed assuming that bˆ ≥ npˆ2 − 1,
and hence, aˆ ≥ npˆ2 − 1− t ≥ npˆ2 − 2t. So,
(15) ≥ Pr
[
Bin
(n
2
, pˆ
)
<
npˆ
2
− 2t
]
≥ exp
(
−72t
2
pˆn
)
,
where the last inequality follows from Theorem A.4 by asserting that
√
3pˆn ≤ 3t ≤ pˆn/4. This
results in the following theorem:
Theorem A.5. There exist constants a, b, c > 0 s.t. the following holds. Let X1, . . . , Xn ∈ {0, 1}
be independent random variables, such that for every i ∈ [n] we have 110 ≤ E[Xi] ≤ 910 . Then for
every a ≥ β ≥ 2−bn and every interval I ∈ R of length |I| ≤ c ·
√
n · log( 1β ) we have
Pr [X /∈ I] ≥ β.
B Proof of Theorem 3.6 [22]
Recall the definition of unique-list-recoverable codes:
Definition 3.5. An (α, `, L)-unique-list-recoverable code is a pair of mappings (Enc,Dec) where
Enc : X → ([Y ]×[Z])M , and Dec : (([Y ]×[Z])`)M → XL, such that the following holds. Let
L1, . . . , LM ∈ ([Y ]×[Z])`. Assume that for every m ∈ [M ], if (y, z), (y′, z′) ∈ Lm then y 6= y′. Then
for every x ∈ X satisfying |{m : Enc(x)m ∈ Lm}| ≥ (1− α)M we have that x ∈ Dec(L1, . . . , LM ).
The following theorem is a direct consequence of the results of [22] (appearing implicitly in their
analysis). We include their proof here for completeness.
Theorem 3.6 ([22]). There exist constants C > 1 and 0 < α < 1 such that the following holds.
For all constants M ≤ log |X| and Y, ` ∈ N, and for every fixed choice of functions h1, . . . , hM :
X → [Y ], there is a construction of an (α, `, L)-unique-list-recoverable code
Enc : X → ([Y ]× [Z])M and Dec : (([Y ]× [Z])`)M → XL,
where L ≤ C · ` and Z ≤ (|X|1/M · Y )C . Furthermore, there is a mapping E˜nc : X → [Z]M such
that for every x ∈ X we have Enc(x) =
(
(h1(x), E˜nc(x)1), ..., (hM (x), E˜nc(x)M )
)
.
We use the following tools in the construction:
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1. We will use a (standard) error-correcting code (enc,dec) with constant rate that can correct
an Ω(1)-fraction of errors. Such codes exist with linear time encoding and decoding [32, 15].
We partition enc(x) into M contiguous bitstrings of equal length O(log |X|)/M , and let
enc(x)m denote the m
th bitstring (for m ∈ [M ]). Note that we write (enc, dec) to denote this
(standard) error correction code, and (Enc,Dec) for the unique-list-recoverable code that we
are constructing.
2. We also use a d-regular λ0-spectral expander
6 F on M vertices for some d = O(1), where
λ0 = αd for some (small) constant α > 0 to be specified later. Such an F can be constructed
in time poly(M) with d = poly(1/α) deterministically, for every M of the form M = Di for
some constant D. See [28].7
We now define E˜nc : X → [Z]M and Enc : X → ([Y ]× [Z])M . For m ∈ [M ] we define:
E˜nc(x)m =
(
enc(x)m, hΓ(m)1(x), . . . , hΓ(m)d(x)
)
and Enc(x)m =
(
hm(x), E˜nc(x)m
)
,
where Γ(m)k is the k
th neighbor of m in F . Observe that logZ = O(log |X|)/M + d · log Y , and
hence, Z ≤ (|X|1/M · Y )C for some constant C.
We now explain how the decoder Dec operates. To that end, let L1, . . . , LM ∈ ([Y ]×[Z])` be
such that for every m ∈ [M ], if (y, z), (y′, z′) ∈ Lm then y 6= y′.
We construct the following graphG on the layered vertex set V = [M ]×[Y ]. Form ∈ [M ], we can
view each element (y, z) ∈ Lm as suggesting d edges to add to G. Specifically, if z = (e, y1, . . . , yd),
then this suggests connecting (m, y) with each of (Γ(m)1, y1), . . . , (Γ(m)d, yd). We then let G be
the graph created by including the at most (d/2) ·∑m |Lm| edges suggested by the elements across
all Lm’s (we only include an edge if both endpoints suggest it).
Fix a domain element x ∈ X satisfying |{m : Enc(x)m ∈ Lm}| ≥ (1 − α)M . The goal of
the decoder Dec is to recover x. Let W be the set of M vertices {(m,hm(x))}Mm=1. Consider
first the ideal case in which the encodings Enc(x)m appear throughout all of the lists Lm, i.e.,
|{m : Enc(x)m ∈ Lm}| = M . In this case, W would be an isolated connected component in G, and
furthermore the induced graph on W would be F . We will use the following lemma (a version of
this lemma is known as the expander mixing lemma):
Lemma B.1 ([1]). Let A be the adjacency matrix of a d-regular graph with vertex set V . Suppose
the second largest eigenvalue of A in magnitude is λ > 0. Then for any S ⊆ V , writing |S| = r|V |,
|∂S| ≥ (d− λ)(1− r)|S|.
By Lemma B.1, in the ideal case, for any subset A of W with |A| = r|W | = rM we have
|E(A,W \A)| ≥ (d− λ0)(1− r)rM ≥
(
r(1− r)− λ0
4d
)
dM.
Let us now understand the possible effects of “bad” indexes on W , where we say that m ∈ [M ]
is bad if Enc(x)m /∈ Lm. We can no longer argue that W is an isolated copy of F , but what we can
say, even with αM bad indexes, is that W forms an O(α)-spectral cluster:
6We say that a graph is a λ-spectral expander if the second largest eigenvalue, in magnitude, of its unnormalized
adjacency matrix is at most λ.
7The assumption that M = Di can be removed as follows. The construction only needs a spectral expander, and
not an edge expander, and spectral expansion can be verified efficiently. As a random graph is a spectral expander
with high probability, so we can construct an expander for every M in efficient Las Vegas time.
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Definition B.2. An η-spectral cluster is a vertex set W ⊆ V of any size satisfying the following
two conditions: First, only an η-fraction of the edges incident to W leave W , that is, |∂(W )| ≤
η · vol(W ), where vol(W ) is the sum of edge degrees of vertices inside W . Second, given any subset
A of W , let r = vol(A)/vol(W ) and B = W \A. Then
|E(A,B)| ≥ (r(1− r)− η)vol(W ).
Note r(1− r)vol(W ) is the number of edges one would expect to see between A and B had W been
a random graph with a prescribed degree distribution.
Suppose m is bad. First, W might lose at most d edges from F (those corresponding to edges
incident upon vertex m in F ). Second, Lm might contain an element (y, z
′) s.t. y = hm(x), but
z′ 6= E˜nc(x), possibly causing edges to be included in W which do not appear in F , or even inserting
edges that cross the cut (W,G\W ). At most d such edges are inserted in this way. Thus, across all
bad indexes, the total number of F -edges deleted within W is at most αdM , and the total number
of edges crossing the cut (W,G \W ) is also at most αdM . Also, the volume vol(W ) is always at
most dM and at least (1 − α)dM . Thus after considering bad indexes, for any subset A of W as
above,
|E(A,W \A)| ≥
(
r(1− r)− λ0
4d
− α
)
dM ≥ (r(1− r)− α0)vol(W ).
for α0 ≥ α+ λ0/(4d) = 5α/4. Furthermore, the number of edges leaving W to G \W is
|∂(W )| ≤ αdm ≤ α
1− αvol(W ) ≤
5α
4
vol(W ) ≤ α0vol(W ),
for α ≤ 1/4. Thus W is an α0-spectral cluster in G representing x. Our task of identifying W
therefore reduces to a clustering problem (identifying spectral clusters in G), which we can solve
using the following algorithm:
Theorem B.3 ([22]). There exists universal constants η0 and K such the following holds. There
is a polynomial time and linear space algorithm A that, for any given η ≤ η0 and graph G = (V,E),
finds a family of disjoint vertex sets U1, . . . U` so that every η-spectral cluster U
∗ of G matches
some set Ui in the sense that
• vol(U∗ \ Ui) ≤ 3 η · vol(U∗).
• vol(Ui \ U∗) ≤ K η · vol(U∗).
Applying the above theorem to our graph G, we have that algorithm A recovers a W ′ missing
at most 3α0vol(W ) volume from W , and containing at most Kα0vol(W ) volume from G \W .
After obtaining W ′, we remove any vertex from W ′ of degree ≤ d/2, so W ′ contains at most
2Kα0vol(W )/d ≤ 2Kα0M vertices from outside W . Furthermore, since there are at most αdM
edges lost from W due to bad indexes, at most 2αM vertices in W had their degrees reduced to
≤ d/2, and thus removing low-degree vertices removed at most 2αM vertices from W . Also, as
W ′ is missing at most 3α0vol(W ) volume from W , we have that W ′ misses at most 6α0M vertices
with degree > d/2 from W . Overall, W ′ contains at most 2Kα0M vertices from outside W , and
misses at most (6α0 + 2α)M vertices from W .
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We then form a (corrupted) codeword c′ by concatenating encoding chunks specified by the
vertices in W ′. Since then at most a ((2K + 6)α0 + 2α)-fraction of entries in enc(x) and c′ differ,
for α sufficiently small, we successfully decode and obtain the binary encoding of x.
It remains to show that the number of identified elements (denoted as L) is small. To that end,
observe that in the analysis above we had vol(W ′) ≥ vol(W ) − vol(W \W ′) ≥ (1 − α − 3α0)dM .
Moreover, recall that the total number of edges in G is at most `dM , and hence, there could be at
most 2`dM(1−α−3α0)dM = O(`) such clusters W
′. So L = O(`).
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